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The United States has long relied on economic sanctions for a sim-
ple reason: they seem to offer a middle path between violence and talk.
This basic attraction has prompted the U.S. to use economic sanctions on
over 200 occasions in this century for a wide variety of purposes ranging
from weakening adversaries, toppling governments, and promoting hu-
man rights' to opening foreign markets, protecting intellectual property,2
and conserving the global commons.'
In recent years, however, the use of economic sanctions has come in
for stricter scrutiny than ever before. One reason has been a resurgence
1. Although the U.S. is a frequent user of sanctions it is by no means the only user. Of
the 116 post-World War I foreign policy sanctions episodes examined by Hufbauer, Schott
and Elliott through 1990, 77 involved the United States either alone or in concert with allies.
The remaining 39 cases involved exclusively non-US, sending states, and the authors admit
they probably missed a number of cases involving foreign 'senders' of sanctions. GARY
CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT
POLICY, 8-9 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (2d ed.)]. See
also HUFBAUER ET AL, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POL-
ICY 13-20 (1 st ed. 1985) [hereinafter ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.)] (listing
the 103 cases analyzed in that edition).
2. Here, the most frequent user has been the U.S. followed by the European Union.
Since 1974, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 has authorized the President to retaliate
against foreign trade practices that infringe GATT rights or are otherwise 'unreasonable.'
Bayard and Elliott report that the United States overtly invoked Section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974 in 89 separate cases over the period 1974-1992. Thomas 0. Bayard & Kimberly A.
Elliott, 'Aggressive Unilateralism' and Section 301: Market Opening or Market Closing?, 15
WORLD ECON. 685, 687 (1992) [hereinafter, Aggressive Unilateralism]; Alan 0. Sykes, Con-
structive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limit Case for
Section 301, 23 L. & POL'Y INT'L. Bus. 263 (1992) [hereinafter Constructive Unilateral
Threats].
3. About 20 multilateral agreements currently require or authorize nations to restrict
imports or exports of goods or services to promote some conservation purpose. See WTO
Secretariat, Trade Measures for Environmental Purposes Take Pursuant to Multilateral Envi-
ronmental Agreements: Recent Developments, WTO Doc. PC/SCTE/W/3 (Oct. 13, 1994).
The most significant of these trade-related MEAs are the Basel Convention on the Control of
Trans-boundary Movements of Hazardous Waste (Basel Convention), the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances That
Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol). In addition, the United States has, on occasion,
used or threatened targeted trade restrictions to: (1) curb illegal trade in body parts of endan-
gered rhinos and tigers (China and Taiwan); (2) deter illegal taking of depleted Atlantic
bluefin tuna in violation of IATTC norms (Belize and Honduras); (3) enforce the IWC mora-
torium on commercial whaling (Norway, Russia, Iceland, Japan); (4) uphold General
Assembly Resolutions banning the use of large scale driftnets on the high seas (Italy, Taiwan,
Korea); (5) protect endangered sea turtles in the shrimp trawling process (a number of Latin
American and Asian fleets); and (6) conserve dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific tuna
fishery (10-12 nations). Id. The European Union, a less frequent user, recently enacted a ban
on import of fur from countries (such as the U.S. and Canada) that allow the use of leg-hold
traps. For an excellent overview of cases involving the non-U.S. and foreign use of trade
leverage for global environmental purposes both unilaterally and pursuant to multilateral
agreements, see Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures
against Foreign Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 95, 98-106
(Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) [hereinafter GATT Legal Restraints].
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in the use of sanctions in recent years.4 The main reason for the current
preoccupation with sanctions reform, however, is a sustained media and
lobbying initiative organized by the U.S. business community under the
banner of "USA*Engage."5 The campaign, begun in 1997, has already
won a small deluge of newspaper editorials and stories, virtually all
critical of sanctions.6 It has achieved the introduction of legislation that
would impose procedural shackles on all new sanctions.7 Meanwhile, the
movement appears already to have accomplished a significant change in
the mental grid through which congressional leaders perceive sanctions:
a long-standing congressional presumption in favor of sanctions appears
to have been replaced-in the minds of prominent lawmakers-by a pre-
sumption against.'
4. A 1997 National Association of Manufactures (NAM) study catalogues 61 U.S. laws
and executive actions authorizing unilateral economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes,
targeting 35 countries, which were enacted over the period 1993-1996. NAT'L Ass'N OF
MFRS., A CATALOG OF NEW U.S. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY
PURPOSES, 1993-96, at v (Mar. 1997) [hereinafter, CATALOG OF NEW SANCTIONS]. The new
spate of sanctions included such controversial measures as the Helms-Burton Act and the
Iran/Libya Sanctions Act, which threaten to punish third-country corporations that conduct
business in Cuba, Iran and Libya. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., U.S. Economic Sanctions:
Their Impact on Trade, Jobs and Wages (Inst. Int'l Econ. Working Paper, 1997) (visited Feb.
1, 2000) <www.iie.com/CATALOG/WP/1997/SANCTION/ sanctnwp.htm> [hereinafter
Sanctions Costs].
5. For an overview of this campaign and its message see USA Engage-About Us,
(visited Feb. 12, 2000) <www.usaengage.org/ backgroung/about.html>.
6. For a small sampling see Gary Hufbauer, The Snake Oil of Diplomacy: When Ten-
sions Rise, the U.S. Peddles Sanctions, WASH. POST, Jul. 12, 1998, at Cl [hereinafter Snake
Oil]; Evelyn Iritani, U.S. Learns How to Anger Friends While Failing to Influence Enemies,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1997, at A6; Richard Lawrence, Editorial, Sanctions Debate Enters
Critical Phase, J. COM., Aug. 2, 1999, at 8 [hereinafter Sanctions Debate]; Michael S. Lely-
veld, Business Fights Sanctions Tide: Trade Council to Address Impact on Economy, Jobs, J.
CoM., Feb. 4, 1997, at IA available in Lexis-Nexis; Jack R. Payton, U.S. Sanctions: Talk
Softly, Carry No Stick, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 21, 1998, at 2A; Barbara Slavin, Sanc-
tions May Be Losing Favor As Top Policy Weapon, USA TODAY, Jun. 25, 1998, at 10A;
Louis Uchitelle, Who's Punishing Whom?; Trade Bans Are Boomerangs, U.S. Companies
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at D1. A more comprehensive listing of anti-sanctions news
stories in 1999 can be found at <www.usaengage.org/resources/ editorcomm99.html>.
7. See, for example, The Sanctions Policy Reform Act (S. 757), introduced March 24,
1999, which would establish a procedural rule requiring detailed analysis of the domestic and
foreign economic impact of any proposed new sanction, the likely effectiveness of the meas-
ure if adopted, and available alternatives to sanctions. It would also sunset each and every
sanction provision after two years unless it is affirmatively re-enacted by Congress, and give
the President broad waiver authority to rescind sanctions determined to be too costly or inef-
fective. Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999). See also Enhancement
of Trade, Security, and Human Rights through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 2708, 105th
Cong. § 1 (1997).
8. As Richard Lawrence observed in the Journal of Commerce on August 2, 1999,
"Congress' attitude toward sanctions appears much changed from only a short time ago. In
September 1997, roughly 20 bills advocated tighter sanctions. Now, of roughly three dozen
Winter 2000]
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Powering the USA*Engage campaign, intellectually, are two broad
claims: (1) economic sanctions are costly to U.S. businesses, farmers and
workers; and (2) economic sanctions are seldom effective and sometimes
counter-productive. 9 Hence the call for more rigorous prior analysis of
sanctions proposals.' ° In itself, of course, a call for closer scrutiny of the
costs and benefits of sanctions would seem virtually unopposable. But
the requirement does bring to the fore what turns out to be a very diffi-
cult question: how do we gauge the cost and effectiveness of economic
sanctions, either ex ante or ex post? In other words, how do we know
what we think we know about the cost and effectiveness of economic
sanctions?
This Article looks "beneath the bridge" of sanctions law and policy
to investigate these foundational questions. Part I will look briefly be-
hind the currently prevailing estimate for the direct economic cost of
high foreign policy export sanctions for the U.S. economy. It will dem-
onstrate that the most widely reported aggregate cost estimate of $15-20
billion per year and 200,000 U.S. jobs lost is unsubstantiated." Moreo-
ver, the evidence is clear that environmental trade sanctions, i.e., import
restrictions deployed for environmental purposes, have cost U.S. com-
panies and workers virtually nothing. 2 Trade sanctions may impose very
significant costs on individual companies, and these costs may raise is-
sues of fairness and the appropriateness of compensation. But there is no
bills pending, most would rescind sanctions or reform the sanctions process." Sanctions De-
bate, supra note 6, at 8.
9. See USA*Engage, The High Costs of Unilateral Sanctions, (last visited March 17,
2000) <www.usaengage.org/studies/costs.html>; Sanctions Revisited: Before Subcomm. on
Int'l. Econ. Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Int'l. Relations, 105th Cong. 44 (1998)
(testimony of Frank Kittredge, Vice Chairman for USA*Engage) [hereinafter, Kittredge Tes-
timony].
10. Although those trade policy sanctions aimed at promoting commercial interests are
exempted from the proposed legislation, measures devoted to international environmental
goals are tarred by the same brush as "high foreign policy" sanctions aimed at punishing for-
eign dictators, etc. See Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, at § 4(l)(G).
11. See Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions Before the House Comm. on Way
and Means, 105th Cong. at 108-09 (1997) (statement of Kimberly Ann Elliott, Research
Fellow, Institute for International Economics); Sanctions Costs, supra note 4, at 7; Snake Oil,
supra note 6, at C4; Finlay Lewis Washington, Economic Interests Always Will Triumph Over
Foreign Policy Goals, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 14, 1998, at C-4 (citing Hufbauer);
Donald L. Losman, Economic Sanctions: An Emerging Business Menace, 33 BUSINESS ECON.
37 (1998); Marcus Noland, Learning to Love the WTO, 78 FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at
86 (quoting Hufbauer et al.); Barbara Slavin, Sanctions May Be Losing Favor as Top Policy
Weapon, USA TODAY, June 25, 1998, at 10A.
12. See infra note 39 and accompanying discussion. Sanctions may, of course, carry very
high moral, humanitarian and political costs for both target and sending states. These costs are
very important elements which I will address indirectly under the heading of "effectiveness."
See discussion infra Part II.B.5 and 6 (discussing the importance of political costs in sanctions
impact assessments).
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evidence to support the notion that the current regime of economic sanc-
tions poses any significant threat to the U.S. economy as a whole.
Part II takes up the more significant issue of how we know what we
think we know about the effectiveness of sanctions in achieving U.S.
policy goals. By "effectiveness" I mean the contribution of sanctions to
achieving desired changes in target state behavior-excluding any sym-
bolic, expressive, or domestic political function." It will be seen that the
case for the general ineffectiveness of sanctions is built on a combina-
tion of anecdotes, case studies, and multi-case "scorecards" of sanctions
successes and failures. But anecdotes, while highly beneficial as specific
illustrations, are too shallow and selective, analytically, to provide a
conclusive foundation for sanctions policy. Case studies, while deeper
and more nuanced, are narrow and difficult to digest. 4 Too often the in-
sights yielded by case studies are shrouded in detail and entombed
within the volumes in which they first appeared. Scorecards, on the other
hand, seem to capture the best of both approaches. They draw on in-
depth case studies to explore the respective contribution of multiple
factors (including sanctions) across a wide range of cases. Moreover,
they often employ quantitative techniques which yield a numerical
"success rate" for sanctions, as well as a finding of "significance" (or
not) for each of any number of independent variables tested." This ap-
pealing combination of brevity, comprehensiveness, and quantitative
rigor has made scorecards by far the most influential indices of sanctions
effectiveness.
Part II will reveal, however, serious methodological flaws that un-
dermine the validity of the leading scorecards currently in use-and call
into question their wide influence. Some of the problems afflicting
these scorecards illustrate problems of measurement and method that
arise in quantitative analyses of social phenomena generally. Others
are methodological challenges that extend to all empirical studies of
sanctions, including case studies. Although some of the discussion in
Part II will be technical, I should emphasize that I approach the subject
not as a practicing econometrician, but as an educated consumer of
13. In this respect I deliberately depart from Baldwin's line of defense of sanctions as
signaling and expressive devices aimed as much at domestic audiences as at the target state.
DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT (1985) [hereinafter ECONOMIC STATECRAFT].
There is much, of course, to be said for sanctions as speech-mechanisms for dissociating
sending states from immoral and harmful conduct by target states. My exclusion of speech
values in this analysis is solely for reasons of analytical interest: sanctions almost by defini-
tion achieve their speech goals, but they do not always achieve helpful change in foreign
behavior.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.B. for a detailed discussion of scorecard approaches.
Winter 20001
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quantitative analysis, addressing fellow consumers. The goal is not to try
to de-bunk the use of quantitative methods in analyzing economic sanc-
tions per se, but simply to illuminate, for the lay reader, the kinds of
methodological problems that must be addressed, and solved, by any
sanctions impact assessment that claims our trust as a basis for law and
policy.
The discussion in Part II will focus on sanctions scorecards and, in
particular, on the quantitative analysis employed by Hufbauer, Schott
and Elliott in their monumental study of high foreign policy sanctions,
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Those who call for "cost-benefit"
analysis of sanctions may be tempted at this point to assume, or argue,
that my critique is safely confined to the HSE study or, at most, to quan-
titative scorecards. Traditional case studies (and extrapolations from
same) may continue, undisturbed by any new concerns about method.
Such complacency is misplaced. Close examination of the problems
discussed below in connection with quantitative scorecards-lack of a
control group, biased case selection, omitted variables, missing data,
mis-specified models, multicollinearity, problems of endogeneity, prob-
lems defining the boundaries of episodes and the criteria of success,
subjectivity problems, expectancy effects-will immediately reveal that
many if not all of these problems also afflict efforts to draw ordinal in-
ferences from case studies and, by extension, efforts to predict future
outcomes based on past experience. Most of the rules of "econometrics"
are, after all, simply rules of valid measurement and rules of logical in-
ference. Measurement problems inhere in any situation (such as
sanctions episodes) in which outcomes depend of the relative magni-
tudes of conflicting social forces ("variables"). Ignore measurement and
you ignore relevant differences-whether your vehicle is a scorecard or
a case study. Other "econometric" requirements-such as the require-
ment for including all relevant variables, specifying a plausible model,
controlling for confounding factors, and taking into account feedback
effects-are equally applicable to case studies. They are simply rules of
logic for drawing valid inferences from the experience of history.
In short, I have chosen to focus on the HSE scorecard because it is
prominent, clear, systematic and, hence, very useful in exposing the
problems of method and measurement that perplex the study of sanctions
generally. It is utterly wishful thinking, however, to pretend that these
problems can be avoided by more anecdotes, or by continuation of the
present tradition of inconsistently and partially analyzed case studies.
Most of Part II will be devoted to examining studies of sanctions
themselves. However, the last section of that part will take up a different
but closely related issue-the validity of extrapolating conclusions about
[Vol. 21:235
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the effectiveness of sanctions from one area of policy to another.'6 This
part will demonstrate that the experience of "high foreign policy" sanc-
tions (even if properly analyzed) does not apply a fortiori to trade
measures aimed at preserving the global commons. There is simply no
logical or empirical basis for the USA*Engage practice of lumping envi-
ronmental sanctions into the same analytical pot as "high foreign policy"
measures aimed at quite different ends. 17
Ultimately, economic sanctions are a two-edged sword of variable
sharpness. They can be potent or impotent, constructive or counter-
productive, depending on the circumstances and the manner in which
they are used. Even the critics of sanctions recognize this, which is why
they are not proposing to outlaw economic sanctions altogether. 8 Rather,
they insist only that sanctions be confined to cases where they appear
cost-effective based on prior, and continuing, analysis."9 The request is
perfectly reasonable, in principle. What it overlooks, however, is the fact
that current methods and studies do not yet provide a sound empirical or
theoretical foundation for estimating the costs or effectiveness of indi-
vidual sanctions either ex ante or ex post. In the absence of such a
foundation, calls for "cost-benefit" analysis of sanctions are at best pre-
mature; at worst, a farce.
Although the focus of this article is on critiquing the current state of
our "knowledge" of sanctions impact, Part III will examine briefly and
preliminarily what should be done to establish a sound basis for "cost-
benefit" analyses of future sanctions. It will be seen that the first and
foremost requirement of sound sanctions policy is a renewed
commitment to open-minded, searching, empirical examination of the
actual role of economic leverage in the cases where it has been used.
This examination should begin by developing a quality-controlled
database of case studies involving the threat and/or use of sanctions.
These case studies should be carefully structured to apply a consistent,
comprehensive, and coherent analytical framework that includes the
major variables that bear on sanctions effectiveness and incorporates
what is known about the causal pathways by which economic sanctions
influence behavior. Much more effort is needed in developing reliable
measures of key variables that bear on sanctions effectiveness, and/or in
16. See infra Part II.C.12.
17. See, e.g., Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. § 4 (1999) (defining
covered unilateral sanctions to include environmental sanctions).
18. Id. (imposing procedural restrictions on new sanctions without proposing to prohibit
existing or new sanctions measures); Kittredge Testimony, supra note 9, at 6-7 ("[W]e recog-
nize that there will be times when sanctions will be used. We believe that we should make
them as effective as possible .... ).
19. See Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757.
Winter 2000]
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finding reliable methods for assigning ordinal "scores" to subjective
variables. Precautions should be taken to guard against the well-
documented "expectancy effects" which plague all analyses involving
subjective assessments. For example, sanctions impact assessment
should not be performed (at least not exclusively) by agencies with
vested policy interests or by experts with financial ties to economic
stakeholders.
In general, my discussion will reveal that getting sanctions right will
require considerably more resources than have been devoted to sanctions
analysis to date. The standards of analysis which I call for may sound, to
some, methodologically extreme. But are they? Is it extreme to suggest
that the government that presides over a $9 trillion dollar economy-and
purports to be a leader in shaping the destiny of the world-should show
at least as much diligence in assessing a major tool of foreign policy as
the average pharmaceutical company devotes to testing the safety and
effectiveness of a hair tonic?I
I. MEASURING AND REPORTING THE COST OF SANCTIONS
TO THE U.S. ECONOMY
Before examining the effectiveness of economic sanctions, it is im-
portant to review and place in perspective the evidence of their cost to
the U.S. economy. Although news stories and internet sites abound with
anecdotes of contracts and sales lost to economic sanctions, by far the
most widely cited and influential estimate of the costs of high foreign
policy sanctions to the U.S. economy overall is the one prepared by
Hufbauer, Elliott, Cyrus and Winston (HECW) in 1997.2 This section
will examine the methodology used in that study, as well as the way the
results have been reported. It will be seen that their model is plausible
and their method sound, with one small caveat. But the packaging and
reporting of their results to and by the media leaves much to be desired.
The reporting appears to have distorted and exaggerated the actual find-
ings of sanction cost.
20. 1995 GNP was $7.3 trillion. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ECON. AND STAT. AD-
MIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1998, at 456, tbl.
721 (1998). 1998 GNP was reported to be $ 8.5 trillion. See Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Gross
Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter 1998 (Final), News Release, Mar. 31, 1999, (last modi-
fied Mar. 31, 1999) <www.bea.doc.gov/bea/newsrel/gdp498f.htm>.
21. Sanctions Costs, supra note 4.
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A. Costing Methodology and Conclusions
Rather than try to estimate the direct and indirect cost of individual
sanctions episodes and then sum these costs across all episodes, HECW
employ an ingenious heuristic model called the "gravity model." This
model is so named for its conceptual affinity to Newton's theory which
holds that the gravitational pull between two celestial bodies is posi-
tively related to the product of their masses and inversely related to their
distance apart. 2  As applied to trade, the gravity model predicts that the
amount of trade between two countries, other things equal, will be posi-
tively related to the product of their outputs (analogous to size or mass)
and inversely proportional to the distance between them. Since other
things are not always equal, HECW insert additional variables to control
for factors which might be expected to increase trade flows beyond what
mere size and distance between capitals would suggest: e.g., high per
capita GNP, sharing a common border, sharing a common language
and/or belonging to the same trading bloc. 23 After initially running the
regressions with two-way trade as a dependent variable, HECW re-run
the regressions using OECD exports and U.S. exports, respectively, as
dependent variables in order to isolate the impact of foreign sanctions on
U.S. businesses and workers. Finally, HECW insert nine dummy vari-
ables to reflect the existence of (1) limited, (2) moderate, or (3)
extensive economic sanctions between each pair of countries which, in
each case, are (1) in place in each of the measurement years 1985, 1990,
or 1995, (2) ended one to two years prior to each of the measurement
years, and (3) ended three to four years prior to each of the measurement
years. The purpose of the lagged variables is to try to determine whether
sanctions have a residual impact after they are lifted due to the so-called
"unreliable supplier effect."24
The authors find a highly significant correlation between sanctions
and two-way trade during the years that sanctions are in place. They also
find a statistically significant and negative impact on U.S. exports during
the years that sanctions are in place.25 This is not too surprising since
most such sanctions take the form of export restrictions. However,
HECW find no conclusive evidence of a residual effect dampening trade
in the years immediately following repeal of sanctions, though the
authors acknowledge the possibility of significant residual impacts in
individual sectors.26 In other words, residual "unreliable supplier"
22. Id. at 2.
23. Id. at 3-4.
24. Id. at 4.
25. Id. at 6 and tbl. 8.
26. Id. at 5.
Winter 2000]
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effects, while they may exist in individual sectors, are not large enough
to produce a statistically significant lagged decline in two-way, bilateral
trade overall.27
The estimated coefficients for sanctions provide a measure of the
average effect of imposing a "limited," "moderate," or "extensive" sanc-
tion, respectively, in reducing U.S. exports to a target country. Applying
these coefficients to actual imports in 1995 enables HECW to calculate
an estimated reduction in U.S. exports to each sanctioned country, which
can then be summed to yield an estimate of total exports lost in 1995 as
a result of foreign policy sanctions overall. 28 These calculations yield a
total estimated reduction in U.S. exports of between $15 and $19 billion
in 1995. Taking Commerce Department estimates for the average labor
intensity in export industries in 1992, with suitable adjustments for pro-
ductivity growth between 1992 and 1995, HECW estimate that each $1
billion of lost exports would correspond to a loss of 13,800 jobs, if lost
exports are not compensated by sales elsewhere. On this assumption and
applying the ratio of 13,800 export jobs per billion dollars of lost ex-
ports, HECW calculate that a loss of $15 to $19 billion in lost exports
would translate to 200,000 to 260,000 lost U.S. jobs. 9
In the primary report of their results, HECW are careful to point out
that in a full employment economy, "lower exports do not spell an over-
all drop in employment., 30 But they insist that a loss of exports does
mean a loss of wages in the form of the "export sector wage premium."
Citing Commerce Department data that suggest a U.S. export wage pre-
mium of about $4,080 per worker over non-export wages, the authors
compute the loss to the U.S. economy of $800 million to $1 billion per
year-the $4,800 per-worker export wage premium multiplied by the
putative 200,000-260,000 lost export jobs.
27. Id. at 6.
28. This method does not work, of course, for "extensive" sanctions which have the ef-
fect of curtailing virtually all U.S. exports to a target country. For these countries, export
reductions as a result of sanctions are calculated by a variety of means: (1) for Iraq and Libya,
setting the reduction at the level of U.S. exports in the last year before sanctions were im-
posed, adjusted for trends in world exports to the target; (2) for North Korea, setting the
reduction at the U.S. share of 1995 OECD exports to South Korea multiplied by OECD ex-
ports to North Korea in 1995; (3) for Cuba, setting the reduction in U.S. exports at the U.S.
share of 1995 OECD exports to the Dominican Republic multiplied by 1995 OECD exports to
Cuba; and (4) for Serbia & Montenegro, setting the reduction in U.S. exports at estimated
1995 U.S. exports to all of Yugoslavia less observed exports to Croatia and Bosnia Herzo-
govina. Id. at tbl.8.
29. Id. at 7.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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B. Critique
The gravity model employed by HECW has been used for nearly
forty years to measure the impact of commercial policy measures on bi-
lateral trade flows.32 The authors' application of it to the sanctions
context appears to be basically sound. This section will discuss three
main problems with the HECW sanctions cost estimates: (1) the presen-
tation of their results to the public; (2) the authors' assumption that a
loss of exports to a sanctioned country cannot be made up by exports
elsewhere; and (3) the tendency of USA*Engage (though not HCEW) to
apply the "cost critique" to all types of sanctions without distinction
between policy contexts.
1. Presenttion of results. The HECW estimate that U.S. foreign
policy sanctions would cost the U.S. economy $15-20 billion per year
and cost 200,000 jobs per year has been repeated in any number of ad-
vocacy statements and media reports.33 Seldom, if ever, do public reports
of the HECW findings place them in the perspective of a $7-8 trillion
U.S. gross national product in the 1995 measurement year.34 While the
average reader might be shocked by sanctions of $20 billion per year,
she might well find herself somewhat less dismayed-assuming sanc-
tions cumulatively accomplish anything at all to enhance our national
security and core values-at learning that something less than one-third
of one percent of GNP has been set aside for the purpose. Moreover, the
average reader's instinct would be right: the impact of sanctions on the
typical American worker or consumer is much more accurately proxied
by the GNP proportion than by the (seemingly large) absolute number.
Moreover, as has been seen, HECW themselves recognize that both
the dollar and the job-loss figures tend to overstate the true cost of sanc-
tions in a full employment economy.35 Under current conditions of full
employment, significant net job loss is impossible almost by definition.
In fact, as HECW acknowledge, the actual loss from sanctions in 1995
was more likely zero jobs and $800 to $1 billion per year of income-
32. See Marcos Sanso et al., Bilateral Trade Flows, The Gravity Equation, and Function
Form, 75 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 266 (1993) (citing long-standing use of the model and
offering a slight refinement).
33. In addition to sources collected supra note 11, see Daniel W. Drezner, Serious about
Sanctions, 53 NATIONAL INTEREST 66 (Fall 1998); David R. Francis, Not Just a World Cop,
US Spends Big to Keep Peace, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 2, 1998, at 1; Paul Mag-
nusson, Getting a Grip on Trade Sanctions, Bus. WK., Nov. 17, 1997, at 115; Richard J.
Mahoney, Limited Role for Government, J. OF COM., Jan. 22, 1998, at 7A; Opinion, Sanctions
Fever, J. OF COM., June 22, 1998, at 6A; John Shaw, Sanctions: enough already, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 28, 1999, at 11.
34. For U.S. GNP data, see 1998 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 20, at 156, tbl. 721.
35. Sanctions Costs, supra note 4, at 7.
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about one-seventieth of one percent of 1995 GNP. (The income loss rep-
resents the export sector wage premium that HECW believe is sacrificed
when export sanctions foreclose export opportunities.) Yet media and
scholars alike have failed to disclose the lower figure which employs
realistic assumptions, instead focusing exclusively on the higher figure
which is based on false assumptions. 36
2. The assumption of irreplaceable exports. It turns out that even the
$800 million to a $1 billion cost estimate may be too high. That estimate
is based on an assumption that exports denied to the target country can-
not be diverted to any other country and therefore will cause layoffs in
export industries, with all laid off workers taking non-export (no export
premium) jobs.37 HECW offer no evidence, however, for the assumption
that exports lost to one country cannot be diverted elsewhere. Surely at
least some can, and to that extent the export wage premium is conserved.
The export wage premium is also conserved to the extent that workers
displaced from one export company take a new job in another export-
oriented company.
As against this upward bias in reported cost estimates, there is the
downward bias associated with the fabled "unreliable supplier effect":
the tendency of foreign purchasers to abstain from placing new orders
with companies deemed to be "unreliable suppliers" due to the export
policies of their parent government. Failure to account for this effect
would tend to under-state actual costs of sanctions. How significant is
the unreliable supplier syndrome? The phenomenon so far has proved to
be as elusive as the so-called "competitiveness" harm caused by high
domestic environmental regulation. Companies swear by it; economists
can't find it in the numbers.3" Under these circumstances, the most that
36. See Kittredge Testimony, supra note 9; Donald V. Fites, From Isolation to Engage-
ment: The Case Against Unilateral Sanctions, Center for the Study of American Business,
CEO Series Issue No. 18, Nov. 1997, at 2-3 ("A study released earlier this year by the Insti-
tute for International Economics found that in 1995 alone, between 200,000 and 250,000 U.S.
jobs were lost due to unilateral U.S. trade sanctions that reduced our exports to 26 target
countries by an estimated $15-20 billion."); Marcus Noland, supra note 11; Lewis, supra note
11, at C4; Barbara Slavin, supra note 11; but see Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Economic
Sanctions: A Primer for Journalists, 87 THE QUILL 21 (Jan/Feb. 1999) (qualifying the $20
billion figure with explanation that in full employment economy the net wage loss is the much
lower figure of $800 million to $1 billion). In other fora, Hufbauer has not been so circum-
spect. See Snake Oil, supra note 6, where Hufbauer offers the $15-20 billion and 200,000 job
loss estimate without caveat.
37. See Sanctions Cost, supra note 4, at 7.
38. Compare USA*ENGAGE, The High Cost of Unilateral Sanctions, at sec. 3 (visited
Jan. 28, 2000) <www.usaengage.org/studies/costs.html> (citing "power generation industry
estimates that it takes seven to ten years to re-establish market share after sanctions have been
imposed and lifted" along with other anecdotal examples of unreliable supplier effects) and
THE PRESIDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL, UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONs: A REVIEW OF
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can be said, reliably, about the cost of foreign policy export sanctions to
the U.S. economy is what can be gleaned from anecdotes: certain com-
panies probably lost some attractive sales and/or investment income that
might have been earned through dealings with a few highly problematic
countries. 9 This state of affairs may raise issues of equity and even
claims for compensation of those companies. The fact remains: the
leading estimate currently available offers no support for the proposition
that the cost of export sanctions to the U.S. economy is large enough to
be a matter of national concern even in the high foreign policy realm
where sanctions are both large and frequent.
3. Extrapolation from high foreign policy to environmental sanc-
tions. Even if one concludes that wide-ranging "foreign policy"
sanctions are costly to U.S. businesses and workers, this does not prove
that environmental sanctions-a term I use to refer to sanctions aimed at
conserving the global commons-are also costly. The latter are rela-
tively rarely applied and, when applied, take a quite different form: they
are narrowly targeted on particular products and they restrict U.S. im-
ports, not exports. So far, the evidence is clear that environmental trade
embargoes have had no deleterious effect on U.S. consumers or work-
ers.4 ' Based on the record to date, USA*Engage is simply off base to
EXISTING SANCTIONS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS WITH RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR POLICY AND PROCESS IMPROVEMENT, app. II (June 1997) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL REvIEw](offering examples of lost U.S. export sales due to
"unreliable supplier" effects arising from sanctions) with Sanctions Cost, supra note 4, at 5
(finding no clear evidence of unreliable supplier effects in macroeconomic statistics). For a
review of the search for hard economic proof of the pollution-haven theory, see Daniel C.
Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 628-38 (1996); ROBERT
REPETTO, JOBS, COMPETITIVENESS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: WHAT ARE THE
REAL ISSUES? (1995).
39. For anecdotal accounts of lost sales see High Cost of Unilateral Sanctions, supra
note 37, at 3-6; Fites, supra note 36; and PRESIDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL REVIEW, supra note
38, at app. 1I. These anecdotes, though cumulatively too lengthy to recount here, should not
be discounted. They strongly suggest lost sales. Moreover, many of these anecdotes involve
failed bids and lost business opportunities due to the threat of future sanctions that never actu-
ally materialize from imposed sanctions. Such losses are not captured by the HECW lagged
variable estimate of residual trade impacts. To that extent, the HECW estimate may tend to
under-state the true cost of sanctions-though the exact magnitude of the bias is hard to pin
down due to the difficulty of determining in each case whether the contract really would have
gone to the U.S. supplier but for threat of sanctions.
40. While foreign policy sanctions have been employed on over 200 occasions, often
covering a very wide range of goods, environmental sanctions have been applied in only three
cases and, in each case, surgically: (1) on imports of purse-seine-caught yellowfin tuna har-
vested in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (to protect dolphins); (2) on turtle-associated shrimp
caught without turtle excluder devices (to protect endangered sea turtles); and (3) very briefly,
on selected wildlife products from Taiwan (to secure Taiwan's cooperation in protecting en-
dangered rhinos and tigers). Environmental sanctions have been explicitly or implicitly
threatened rather more often. See Hudec, supra note 3, at 98-106. The tuna-dolphin import
Michigan Journal of International Law
complain of the high and immediate economic cost of "sanctions" to
U.S. businesses and workers without making any distinction between
sweeping national security export sanctions, on the one hand, and nar-
rowly-focused import restrictions imposed for environmental purposes,
on the other.4'
II. MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRADE SANCTIONS
Having briefly reviewed current estimates of the cost of economic
sanctions, I now turn to the controversy over their effectiveness. A mo-
ment's reflection will reveal that there are three main ways one might go
about empirically substantiating assertions about the effectiveness of
trade sanctions in changing target state behavior: anecdotes, case studies,
restrictions had a significant economic impact on foreign tuna fishers and processors but did
not materially affect U.S. canned tuna prices or jobs. See Richard W. Parker, The Use and
Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the
Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT'L. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 34-36 (1999) [hereinafter, Use and
Abuse of Trade Leverage]. The shrimp-turtle embargoes applied only to Malaysia, Thailand,
India and Pakistan (19 other nations avoided sanctions by complying with U.S. conservation
standards) and appear to have had no impact on U.S. prices or jobs. See Report of the Panel,
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, at
11 .1 and 2.16 (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter, Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report] (review of countries
embargoed and certified); telephone interview with B.G. Thompson, Fisheries Consultant
(Dec. 29, 1999) (explaining that the embargoes had no price impact on consumers because
"75% of shrimp marketed from the U.S. is grown through aquaculture. This is the shrimp that
establishes the market price of shrimp"; and because most imported shrimp was certified by
the State Department as meeting U.S. standards.) If anything, the embargoes benefited U.S.
producers by applying the same standards to foreign producers that already applied domesti-
cally in the U.S. In the rhino-tiger case, the United States imposed about US $25 million
worth of sanctions on the import of Taiwanese fish, leather and similar goods (against a Tai-
wanese annual foreign trade of US $162 billion) in 1994, and repealed the sanctions in 1995
when Taiwan agreed to strengthen enforcement of its illegal trade laws. See Simon Beck, U.S.
Recognises Moves to End Wildlife Trade, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 13, 1996, at 4;
Amy E. Vulpio, Note, From the Forests of Asia to The Pharmacies of New York City:
Searching for a Safe Haven for Rhinos and Tigers, II GEO. INT'L. L. REV. 463, 480 n.138
(1999). In short, no harm to U.S. consumers or workers has been identified in relation to any
of these environmental trade measures to date.
41. Hufbauer et al. are quite careful to limit their observations and recommendations to
the "high foreign policy" context whence their data is drawn. Others are not so careful, how-
ever. The National Association of Manufacturers, for example, simply asserts that the use of
"trade sanctions for environmental protection purposes ... is a new [U.S.] national security
objective," CATALOG OF NEW SANCTIONS, supra note 4, at 2, thereby ignoring a host of im-
portant distinctions between the two types of sanctions relating to scope, method of operation,
cost, political dynamic, and effectiveness. See discussion infra Part II.C.12. Likewise, the
President's Export Council uncritically lists sanctions linked to environmental activity along-
side measures aimed at countries that harbor war criminals, abet terrorism, or fail to cooperate
on narcotics enforcement. See PRESIDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL REVIEW, supra note 38, at app.
1, II.A (terrorism), II.B. (narcotics), II.C (environmental activities), II.D (harboring war crimi-
nals).
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and what I will call "scorecards. 42 Each of these methods, it will be
seen, has its own strengths and weaknesses. After briefly outlining the
rather obvious drawbacks of anecdotes and case studies as tools of em-
pirical analysis, this section will provide a detailed critique of the
methodology used in current scorecards of sanctions effectiveness.
While some of the problems so identified may be resolvable by more
sophisticated methods, this section will conclude that any serious effort
to arrive at reliable measures of effectiveness will need to start by
strengthening both our theoretical understanding of how sanctions work,
and the database of case studies on which all scorecards necessarily
draw.
A. Stories and Studies
Anecdotes of sanction failures-of contracts lost, of human suffer-
ing, and of policy failure-are popular with journalists, speech writers,
and scholars alike for obvious reasons.43 They make good leads for
books and articles. They illustrate points vividly and concisely but not
too laboriously. Accumulation of several anecdotes in support of a
point can give the impression of broad-based empirical support: one is
a prime number, three is a prime number, so are five and seven, ergo,
all odd numbers are prime." Yet, while anecdotes are highly valuable
42. Again, I use the term "effectiveness" to mean the contribution of sanctions to
achieving desired changes in target state behavior-excluding any symbolic, expressive, or
domestic political function-for the reasons set forth in note 13 supra and accompanying text.
43. The proclivity of journalists and editorialists for using anecdotes to support their
claims will be obvious to any newspaper reader. See, e.g., Snake Oil, supra note 6; Drezner,
supra note 33; Louis Uchitelle, Who's Punishing Whom?: Trade Bans are Boomerangs, U.S.
Companies Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at DI, for only a few of the myriad possible
examples of anecdotalism in policy analysis. Of course, the format of most news and maga-
zine stories inherently precludes detailed treatment of either individual cases or the history of
sanctions generally. "Anecdotalism," as I use the term, is defined not by the fact that historical
episodes are treated briefly in short-format pieces, but by the tendency of some authors and
essayists to draw their own inferences and conclusions from the anecdotes they cite, rather
than ground their conclusions on close, contextual and nuanced analysis of in-depth case
studies done by themselves or others. See, e.g., Richard N. Haass, Economic Sanctions: Too
Much of a Bad Thing, (visited Feb. 3, 2000) <www.usaengage.org/studies/
haass 1.html> [hereinafter, Too Much of a Bad Thing]; Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanc-
tions Do Not Work, 22 INT'L SEC., Fall 1997, at 90. Anecdotalism defined in this manner is
neither confined to, nor excused by the confines of, short-format writing. For a prominent
example of anecdotalism employed in the book format, see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS (1995) (relying heavily on their own anecdotal accounts of trade sanctions epi-
sodes to establish the inefficacy of trade sanctions).
44. This is the (obviously intended) effect of the President's Export Council Review,
which dedicates an Appendix entirely to the cataloguing of lost sales from unilateral eco-
nomic sanctions-even though the anecdotes appear to be stories culled uncritically from a
handful of disappointed corporate bidders on foreign contracts (United Technologies, Boeing,
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as illustration, they have only weak probative value for reasons that are
equally obvious: anecdotes are, by definition, isolated examples deliber-
ately (not randomly) picked from the database of history, stripped of
context and nuance by virtue of their brevity and "spun" into a form and
substance suitable to proving a point. Thus, the failure of sanctions to
topple Castro is often cited as support for the inefficacy of economic
sanctions employed for high foreign policy purposes.45 Yet the alert citi-
zen and policy-maker might well ask, did sanctions nonetheless weaken
Castro's ability to finance counter-revolutionary movements in Latin
America; did they force the Soviet Union to deplete its own resources
subsidizing Castro; and/or did economic sanctions force Castro to liber-
alize his state-run economy more than he otherwise might have done?
46
Did the hardships imposed by sanctions on Cuba serve to deter other
countries from choosing the "Communist" and expansionist path during
those years when international communism still had some charisma
overseas? Such questions are hard to answer satisfactorily in the sound-
bite format demanded by anecdotal approaches.
Case studies, on the other hand, restore much of the detail, nuance,
and context omitted by anecdotes. They are an indispensable foundation
for any and all empirical and theoretical analysis of sanctions.4 But case
studies have their own obvious deficiencies. They tend to bog the reader
down in a mass of detail. They yield (quite often) highly nuanced con-
clusions with no sound-bite potential whatever. Case studies offer, at the
end of what may be book-length analysis, only the "lessons" of a single
case.8 And no effort appears to have been made, to date, to develop a
General Electric, Caterpillar). See PRESIDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL REVIEW, supra note 38, at
app. II.
45. See, e.g., Too Much of a Bad Thing, supra note 43, at 5.
46. For an affirmative answer to these subtler questions see Susan Kaufmann Purcell,
Cuba, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 35, 35-57 (Richard N. Haass
ed., 1998). The alert reader may also think at this point to ask, is the anecdote about Cuban
sanctions indicative of the problem of anecdotal approaches generally, or is the author cherry-
picking from the history of the use of anecdotes? But that quandary just further corroborates
my point about the deficiencies of the genre.
47. See discussion infra Part III.
48. For a small sample of the large literature of in-depth case studies of sanctions, see
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC SANC-
TIONS AGAINST RHODESIA: REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
(GAO 1977); MARIA-INEs BASTOS, WINNING THE BATTLE TO LOSE THE WAR: BRAZILIAN
ELECTRONICS POLICY UNDER US THREAT OF SANCTIONS (1994); LES DE VILLIERS, IN SIGHT
OF SURRENDER: THE U.S. SANCTIONS CAMPAIGN AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA (1995); RICHARD
ELLINGS, EMBARGOES AND WORLD POWER: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
(1985); ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (Richard N. Haass ed., 1998)
(offering several concise case studies of sanctions episodes); DAVID W. HUNTER, WESTERN
TRADE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION: AN INTERDEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE ON SANC-
TIONS (1991); DONALD L. LOSMAN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THE CASES OF
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standard analytical format for case studies. The lack of empirical stan-
dardization makes it very difficult to make inter-case comparisons and
contrasts, to account for confounding variables or, ultimately, to extract
from case studies general insights into the factors that contribute to or
undermine sanctions effectiveness.
The deficiencies of anecdotes and case studies as empirical tools
lead straight to the attraction of scorecards.
B. Scorecards
The defining feature of "scorecards," as I use the term, is that they
rate the success of sanctions across a wide spectrum of cases in a given
issue area. Besides tabulating success or failure rates, scorecards also
may examine the correlation between certain variables which are
thought to contribute to success or failure, on one hand, and the actual
success or failure of sanctions, on the other.49 Most of all, scorecards
employ quantitative methods to test hypotheses and report results. Their
methods and conclusions are subject to validation by seemingly objec-
tive criteria: the standards of sound statistical analysis. °
Scorecards are attractive, then, precisely because they appear to
solve many of the problems which bedevil anecdotal accounts and case
studies. By examining all (or all known) cases in a particular issue area,
they avoid the problems of cherry-picking which plague anecdotal ap-
proaches. By scoring cases across a range of variables on the basis of
detailed case studies, scorecards can claim, at least, to be able to detect
general patterns of behavior that emerge from the welter of detail that
fills case studies. Most of all, scorecards are appealing because they dis-
till the experience of a vast range of cases into a few easy-to-report,
easy-to-remember variables and associated numbers which seem to carry
the authority of "science." 5' If there is any explanation for the influence
CUBA, ISRAEL AND RHODESIA (1979); RICHARD SCHWAB, CUBA: CONFRONTING THE U.S.
EMBARGO (1999); ECONOMIC COERCION AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: IMPLICATIONS OF CASE
STUDIES FROM THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION (Sidney Weintraub, ed. 1982). See also
sources cited in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st and 2d eds.), supra note 1, pas-
sim.
49. This is, of course, a primary aim of the HSE study. See ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RE-
CONSIDERED (1st ed.), supra note 1.
50. For lucid and readable introductions to statistics and econometric methods see, re-
spectively, DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS (3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter STATISTICS], and
WILLIAM E. GRIFFITHS ET AL., LEARNING AND PRACTICING ECONOMETRICS (1993)
[hereinafter PRACTICING ECONOMETRICS]..
51. See WENDY NELSON ESPELAND, THE STRUGGLE FOR WATER: POLITICS, RATIONAL-
ITY AND IDENTITY IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 20-24 (1998) and THEODORE M. PORTER,
TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (1995) for
insightful analyses of the attractions of numbers in terms of their seeming objectivity, their
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of scorecard approaches on scholarship and public policy debate, surely
that explanation lies in the brevity, comprehensiveness, and seeming
methodological rigor that scorecards seem to afford.
Trade sanctions scorecards have been compiled in at least three ma-
jor subject areas: (a) high foreign policy; (b) trade policy; and (c)
environmental protection. Before critiquing the leading scorecards it
may be helpful to describe them briefly.
High foreign policy sanctions. By far the most influential empirical
study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions is Hufbauer, Schott and
Elliott's (HSE's) monumental work, Economic Sanctions Reconsid-
ered.5" The work, and/or its lead author, Gary Hufbauer, has been cited
in at least 85 national magazine stories, 100 major newspaper articles or
editorials, and 66 law review articles since it first appeared. 3
In the first edition, HSE employ econometric regression techniques
to examine 103 cases between 1914 and 1985 in which economic sanc-
tions have been applied for five sorts of foreign policy purposes:
(1) Destabilizing foreign governments;
(2) Disrupting military adventures;
(3) Impairing the military potential of a hostile state;
ability to displace fallible human judgement, and their role in imposing "commensurability"
on otherwise disparate values, thereby facilitating "rational" choice.
52. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st and 2nd eds.), supra note 1.
53. These include only the publications that are gathered by Lexis or Westlaw. The list of
citing mass publications includes TIME, NEWSWEEK, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, ECONO-
MIST, FINANCIAL TIMES, BUSINESS WEEK, JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, NEW YORK TIMES,
WASHINGTON POST, Los ANGELES TIMES, BOSTON HERALD, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, NATIONAL JOURNAL, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, BULLETIN OF
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, ST. PETERSBURG (FLORIDA) TIMES, BOSTON HERALD, NEW REPUBLIC,
NEWSDAY, and USA TODAY. See search of LEXiS, News & Magazines and News: Major
Newspapers, "Hufbauer and Sanctions"; search of WESTLAW, JLR, "Economic Sanctions
Reconsidered."
The scholarly publications relying on the database, methods and/or conclusions of ECO-
NOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED include BARRY CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME (1988); CHAYES & CHAYES,
supra note 43, at 92; ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: PANACEA OR PEACEBUILDING IN A POST-COLD
WAR WORLD (David Cortright & George A Lopez eds., 1995); DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING
THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE (1994); LISA MARTIN, COERCIVE CO-
OPERATION: EXPLAINING MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (1992); Peter A.G. van
Bergeijk, Success and Failure of Economic Sanctions, 42 KYKLOS 385 (1989) (using HSE
data to test a "reduced form equation" modeling the sources of sanction effectiveness); Shane
Bonetti, Distinguishing Characteristics of Degrees of Success and Failure in Economic Sanc-
tions Episodes, 30 APPLIED ECON. 805 (1998); Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across
Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influences Over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 1 (1989); Richard N. Haass, Sanctioning Madness, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 74 (Nov./Dec. 1997);
Noland, supra note 11. See also PRESIDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL REVIEW, supra note 38, at
app. 3 (providing a detailed summary of the HSE study and its conclusions).
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(4) Achieving "major" policy change; or
(5) Accomplishing "modest" policy changes.54
The economic sanctions at issue may assume a variety of forms: im-
port and/or export embargoes, withdrawal of economic or military
assistance, or financial asset freezes.5"
HSE measure success in each case by first comparing the sender's
goal with the actual outcome, to yield a policy result score scaled from 1
(complete failure) to 4 (complete success).56 They then assign a sanctions
contribution score also scaled from 1 (sanctions irrelevant or counter-
productive) to 4 (sanctions a major contributor to success).57 Multiplying
the two scores together yields an overall "success score" scaled from 1
(outright failure) to 16 (outright success), with a score of 9 or higher
rated a "success.""8 Applying this scoring method to the evaluation of
case studies of 103 cases over the period 1914-1985, HSE come up with
an overall success rate for sanctions: 36 percent success overall, and 40
percent success rate for sanctions involving "modest policy goals."'59
The conclusion of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered-that sanc-
tions actually "worked" in over a third of the cases-was considered
revisionist at the time (the consensus in scholarly circles then being that
economic sanctions almost never work). 60 This revisionist finding then
led HSE to enlarge the focus of their analysis beyond the threshold
question, whether sanctions ever work, to a more fruitful inquiry into
why sanctions work or fail: what situations and methods of application
are most favorable, and least favorable, to success.6' That, of course, is
precisely the inquiry that USA*Engage is now calling for as a precondi-
tion of new sanctions.62
54. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (Ist. ed.), supra note 1, at 41.
55. See id. at 36-37. The authors define "economic sanctions" as "the deliberate, gov-
emnment-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial trade
relations." Id. at 2. However, as seen infra note 89 and accompanying text, their database
includes only six threat-only cases, an impossibly low number in the context of 115 actual,
imposed sanctions. So it would probably be more accurate to delete the phrase "or threat of
withdrawal" from their definition.
56. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (Ist ed.), supra note 49, at 32-33.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 79-80.
60. As David Baldwin observed in 1985, one "salient characteristic of the literature on
economic statecraft is the tendency to denigrate the utility of such techniques." ECONOMIC
STATECRAFT, supra note 13, at 55. Baldwin supports this assertion with a long list of quota-
tions and cites to authors denying the effectiveness of economic sanctions. Id. at 55-59.
61. See discussion accompanying note 66 infra for their conclusions on the conditions
favoring and disfavoring successful sanctions.
62. See Kittredge Testimony, supra note 9, at 5-7.
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HSE pursue this broader inquiry by employing econometric tech-
niques to test various hypotheses about the factors ("variables") which
might be thought to make sanctions more or less effective. That is, they
correlate the dependent variable (success) on the left-side of the equation
with at least 15 independent variables on the right hand side, and look at
the coefficients and standard errors that result.
63
Besides relying on multivariate regression analysis for insights, HSE
employ a technique known as "cross-tabulation," which involves com-
paring the average score for each independent variable in successful and
failed cases, respectively.64 For example, the authors report that sanctions
have been successful in 52 percent of cases where the policy goal is to
de-stabilize a foreign government, and in 33 percent of cases where the
policy goal is disruption of military adventures or modest policy change.
From this the authors conclude that sanctions deployed for de-
stabilization purposes are "surprisingly successful." However, they also
note the "average index of economic health and political stability for
target governments" is 1.4 in failed cases (on a scale of 1 to 3) and 1.9 in
successful cases. From this the authors conclude that governments in
distress are more easily de-stabilized. Indeed, the second (1990) edition
employs cross-tabs analysis exclusively.65
On the basis of such analysis the authors adduce "Nine Command-
ments" which they suggest designers of sanctions should comply with if
they hope to be successful. The Nine Commandments, essentially un-
changed in the 1985 and 1990 editions, are:
(1) Sender governments should not ask too much of sanctions
(they are seldom effective in achieving major policy change
or impairing the military potential of a major power).
63. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.), supra note 49, at 99-102, app. A.
The "independent" variables appearing on the right-hand side of their regression equation are
(1) time; (2) nature of policy goal; (3) occurrence during world war; (4) accompaniment by
covert action, or not; (5) accompaniment by military force, or not; (6) index of international
cooperation, scaled from I to 4; (7) existence, or not, of third-party assistance to target; (8)
index of prior relations between sender and target, scaled from I to 3; (9) length of sanctions
episodes in years; (10) index of political and economic health and stability of target, scaled
from I to 3; ( 1) cost of sanctions to the target, expressed as a percentage of GNP; (12) pre-
sanction trade linkage between target and sender, expressed as percentage of target's total
trade; (13) relative size of target and sender economies; (14) type of sanction; and (15) index
of cost of sanctions to sender, scaled from 1 to 4. Due to the fact that, for technical reasons,
two dummy variables are used to measure relative economy size (item 13) and three dummy
variables are used to characterize the type of sanction, the actual number of right-hand side
variables appearing in their 1985 regression equation is 18. Id.
64. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (2d ed.), supra note 1, at 93-94, 97.
65. Id. at 91-114.
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(2) Sanctions requiring international cooperation are seldom
successful, while those seeking modest policy changes often
do not require cooperation from allies to succeed.
(3) Sanctions against politically or economically unstable
countries are more likely to succeed than those targeted at
healthy, stable countries.
(4) Economic sanctions aimed at friends and allies are more ef-
fective than those directed against long-time adversaries of
the sender country.
(5) The longer the duration of sanctions, the lower the likeli-
hood of success.
(6) The more costly the sanctions to the target state, the greater
the likelihood of success.
(7) The more sanctions cost the sender, the less likely they are
to succeed.
(8) Companion measures-covert action, quasi-military or
regular military operations-are used most frequently in
conjunction with sanctions involving destabilization or im-
pairment of military potential. Their effect may swamp the
impact of sanctions (causing sanctions to be rated as a
"failed" contribution even when sanctions may have aug-
mented the impact of companion policies).
(9) Sender governments should think through their means and
objectives carefully before taking a final decision to deploy
sanctions.6
Though the HSE study initially made waves for reporting that sanc-
tions work more frequently than had been expected, the authors' own
appraisal of the instrument has diminished over time. Indeed, even in the
first edition (1985) the authors had noted that foreign policy sanctions
seemed to be losing effectiveness: while nearly half of all sanctions be-
gun before 1973 had succeeded, only 25 percent of those begun after
1973 were rated successful.67 From this, HSE concluded that while
"sanctions occasionally bear fruit ... when planted in the right soil and
nurtured in the proper way" they are a "decreasingly useful policy in-
strument., 6' The theme of low and diminishing effectiveness received
66. Compare ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.), supra note 1, at 81-91,
with ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (2d ed.), supra note 1, at 94-105.
67. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.), supra note 49, at 80.
68. Id. at 81.
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more emphasis in the second edition.69 Perhaps the spectacular failure of
Iraqi sanctions-after Hufbauer had publicly predicted success-further
eroded his confidence in economic statecraft. In any case, by 1998
Hufbauer was calling economic sanctions the "snake oil of diplomacy"
and he himself had hired on as a consultant to the USA*Engage sanc-
tions reform campaign.7
Trade policy scorecards. The success of Sanctions Reconsidered -
and the intrinsic appeal of the method it employs-has inspired at least
three additional sanctions scorecards. Two of these, one by Alan Sykes
and another by Thomas Bayard and Kimberly Elliott (BE), examine the
use of U.S. trade leverage to open foreign markets under Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974.72 In examining 83 trade policy disputes over the
period 1974-1990 both studies adopt an essentially binary definition of
"success." Unlike the HSE study, neither of the trade policy studies at-
tempts to assign values to the separate contribution of sanctions to
success.73 Rather, these studies simply examine correlation between cer-
tain independent variables, on one hand, and success or failure, on the
other.74 The main distinction between the studies, beyond the fact that
69. See ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (2d ed.), supra note 1, at 105-14.
70. See discussion infra notes 188-190 and accompanying text.
71. Snake Oil, supra note 6.
72. Aggressive Unilateralism, supra note 2; Constructive Unilateral Threats, supra note
2.
73. Bayard and Elliott claim that they employ a somewhat stricter definition of success
than Sykes, which partly accounts for their lower success rate. Aggressive Unilateralism,
supra note 2, at 695.
74. Sykes considers the impact of six factors: (1) whether or not the cases involves an
alleged GATT violation; (2) whether or not a panel was convened and whether it ruled in
favor of the United States; (3) whether the case involved export promotion; (4) whether the
case involved agriculture (an area deemed particularly problematic); (5) whether or not the
recipient was a developing country dependent on the United States for special trade prefer-
ences (a circumstance thought to heighten U.S. bargaining power); and (6) whether or not the
U.S. actually retaliated in the case. Constructive Unilateral Threats, supra note 2, at 318, app.
BE estimate the impact of five quite different factors derived from a game-theoretic
model devised by John McMillan: (1) economic stakes for the sending state; (2) likelihood of
counter-retaliation; (3) proportion of target's total exports sent to the United States; (4) the
nature of the measure complained of (border restriction, subsidy, or technical/ administrative
barrier); and (5) the credibility of the threat. The first variable, economic stakes, is proxied by
a dummy which takes the value I if the U.S. pre-sanction trade pattern is between $10 million
and $100 million, and zero otherwise, on the theory that small cases (involving products with
below $10 million of pre-sanctions trade) are less credible predicates for retaliation because
the U.S. government is simply less concerned with them, while very large pre-sanctions trade
flows are also less credible situations for retaliations because in those cases the U.S. will fear
counter-retaliation against U.S. exports. Aggressive Unilateralism, supra note 2, at 698-700,
tbl. 4. Factor (2)-likelihood of retaliation-is proxied by a dummy variable, ECCAN, which
takes the value I if the target is EC or Canada, 0 otherwise, on the theory that these are the
only two countries that have ever counter-retaliated against a U.S. trade retaliation in the past.
The indices for factors (3) and (4) are self-evident. Factor (5)-credibility of threat-is
[Vol. 21:235
The Problem with Scorecards
they focus on quite different variables, lies in their basic method of in-
ference. Sykes employs simple "cross-tabulation" techniques to derive
rough, heuristic inferences from the data-such as the interesting insight
that cases involving alleged GATT violations do not have a significantly
higher success rate than cases in which the U.S. acts completely outside
the GATT framework." BE, by contrast, attempt a full-fledged "probit"
regression analysis to try to determine the relative importance of the in-
dependent variables in determining successful outcomes.76
Sykes finds "success" in 31 of 35 completed cases in which the U.S.
alleged a breach of the GATT, and in 27 of 33 completed cases in which
the U.S. complained of an "unreasonable" practice not involving an al-
leged violation of the GATT.77 BE, using a somewhat stricter criterion of
success, conclude that "Section 301 has led to at least partial market
opening in just over half the cases overall, and in two-thirds of the cases
ending after the announcement of the President's trade policy action plan
in September 1985 [a "get-tough" plan]. 78 The rather optimistic results
obtained by studies of the efficacy of trade policy sanctions may account
in some part for the decision of the USA*Engage coalition to exempt
trade policy sanctions from their critique and "reform" proposal.79
The Charnovitz environmental policy scorecard. Steve Charnovitz
has compiled a very informal scorecard of the track record of environ-
mental trade leverage (ETL) in protecting the global commons under the
authority of the so-called Pelly Amendment. ° Charnovitz finds a "58
percent success rate" despite the fact that sanctions were never actually
imposed (only threatened) in the cases comprising his database.8' The
Charnovitz scorecard is a very useful first cut at the issue, but its empiri-
cal pretensions are few. It makes no effort to ascertain the factors
proxied by two dummy variables which take the value I if the sanctions episode occurred
after the September 1985 Trade Policy Action Plan, or after the 1988 Competitiveness Act,
respectively-the idea being that both of these events were "get-tough" signals of U.S. re-
solve to foreign governments). Id.
75. Constructive Unilateral Threats, supra note 2, at 313-15. For a discussion of cross-
tabs see infra Part I.C. 10.
76. Aggressive Unilateralism, supra note 2, at 691-92, 695-96.
77. Constructive Unilateral Threats, supra note 2, at 310, 314.
78. Aggressive Unilateralism, supra note 2, at 687.
79. See Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. § 1, at § 4(1)(G); Kittredge
Testimony, supra note 9.
80. Steve Charnovitz, Recent Developments: Environmental Trade Sanctions and the
GAIT: An Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices 9 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & PoL'v 751 (1994) [hereinafter Analysis of the Pelly Amendment] (examining 14
episodes over the period 1973-1993 involving U.S. invocation of the Pelly Amendment to the
Fisherman's Protective Act to threaten trade sanctions against a foreign country for
"undermining an international conservation agreement.")
81. Id. at 773.
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bearing on the success of ETL, nor does it employ any particular tech-
nique more sophisticated than scoring and counting to tabulate results.
Its case coverage is not comprehensive and, in fact, omits the two most
82important trade and environment cases of the era. But it does suggest
that U.S. sanctions or threats deployed to protect the global commons
have achieved at least some of their objectives on a number of occa-
sions.83
C. Critique of the Scorecard Methodology
All of the scorecards reviewed above represent valuable and impor-
tant contributions to the literature on sanctions. The impressive
enterprise of these authors in collecting an enormously wide range of
cases, analyzing the primary studies, coding variables, and tabulating the
results reflects a commitment to systematic exploration that should, and
no doubt will, serve as both a starting point and inspiration for all future
scholarship in this important field. However, the results of these studies
have been widely reported without, so far, sufficiently rigorous evalua-
tion of the methods used to produce those results.84 As a result, the
82. These are the tuna-dolphin and shrimp-turtle disputes, both landmark disputes that
produced WTO litigation over the U.S. use of trade sanctions to protect global commons
resources. See Hudec, GAT Legal Restraints, supra note 3, at 98-106.
83. See Analysis of the Pelly Amendment, supra note 80, at 806 (finding 12 of 18 cases
of threatened environmental sanctions at least partly successful in achieving conservation
goals).
84. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED has been the subject of numerous reviews in
social science journals, most of which have been broadly favorable though critical of particu-
lar aspects. See generally Margaret Doxey, Review of Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered and Deon Geldenhuys, Isolated States. A Comparative Analysis, 21
MILLENIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 529 (1992) (book review); Jim Leitzel, Hufbauer and Schott:
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 40 KYKLOS 286 (1987) (book
review) (criticizing both scoring of variables and lack of good statistical fit while concluding
nonetheless that "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered represents the current state of the art in
general economic analyses of sanctions."); Richard Stuart Olson, Economic Sanctions Recon-
sidered: History and Current Policy, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 322, (1987) (book review)
(criticizing subjectivity of scoring of variables and questioning the quality of database but
finding the work a "courageous point of departure for rigorous empirical work on economic
sanctions). But see Gregory A. Fossedal, Sanctions for Beginners: When They Work and
When They Don't, 193 NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 21, 1985, at 18 (dismissing ECONOMIC SANC-
TIONS RECONSIDERED as consisting "largely of 'paste-and-clip' assessments taken from other
sources, and attempts to establish ludicrously precise estimates such as 'per capita' harm of
sanctions 'as a share of domestic GNP.' "); Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not
Work, 22 INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1997, at 90, 93 (re-examining the HSE database and claiming
that sanctions did not actually work as often as HSE claim).
The international law and foreign policy community appears to have largely accepted the
HSE findings without major reservation. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Coercion and Com-
munication: frameworks for evaluation of economic sanctions, 19 N.Y.U. INT'L. L. & POL.
781, 787 (1987) [hereinafter, Coercion and Communication](observing that "Hufbauer and
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"numbers" derived from these studies have been allowed to sway schol-
arly and public opinion unguarded by the necessary caveats as to their
reliability. Focusing on the widely-disseminated HSE and BE score-
cards, this section will reveal serious problems of measurement and
method which need to be borne in mind when evaluating their findings
and recommendations.
The specific methodological problems to be reviewed here fall into
twelve main categories: (1) lack of control group; (2) selection bias; (3)
subjectivity; (4) proxy problems; (5) problems of defining the bounda-
ries of "episodes" and "success"; (6) model mis-specification; (7)
problems of endogeneity; (8) collinearity; (9) the difficulty of modeling
dynamic processes by static proxies; (10) invalid cross-tabs compari-
sons; (11) insufficient data and/or unreliable data; and (12) invalid cross-
contextual extrapolation.
1. Lack of Control Group or Baseline
The scorecards mentioned above are generally understood to be
quantitative estimates of the "effectiveness" of trade leverage in achiev-
ing foreign policy, trade policy, or environmental policy goals. In fact,
none of them contain actual estimates of the contribution of trade sanc-
tions per se to policy outcomes. To achieve a true estimate of the
contribution of sanctions to "successful" outcomes, one would have to
compare success rates in cases where trade leverage is used with success
rates in a control groups comprised of cases where leverage is not used.85
The above scorecards contain no such control group, but rather examine
only cases where trade leverage was used. As a result, these scorecards
should be understood not as measures of the effectiveness of sanctions
per se in contributing to favorable outcomes, but rather as measures of
the contribution of various subordinate variables (such as multilateral
cooperation with sender, size of sender, etc.) to the effectiveness of
sanctions in the cases where sanctions are used. 6
Schott's methodology is a well-accepted way to produce precise analyses of complex and
variable data" but that it "requires a great deal of subjective judgment... even if one accepts
the author's analytical framework, other researchers could reach very different conclusions.");
Leopoldo Lovelace, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (2d ed.), 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 178
(1992) (book review offering no criticism of methodology); William Diebold, Jr., Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered, 64 FOR. AnF. 365 (Winter, 1985/86) (book review opining that "this
study is a good antidote to the loose generalizations common to this subject"); Noland, supra
note 11, at 86-88. As will be seen infra, problems of subjectivity are only the tip of the meth-
odological iceberg with which HSE have collided.
85. Indeed, strictly speaking, this would prove only association, not causation or contri-
bution. See STATISTICS, supra note 50, at 150.
86. Logically, one might conceivably arrive at a zero-threat estimate of sanctions contri-
bution by extrapolating from a regression line which correlates size of threat with favorability
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A further consequence of failing to include a control group of sanc-
tion-free cases is to sweep under the rug a key question urgently put
forward by defenders of sanctions: what are the alternatives to sanctions
and how "successful" are they?17 Suppose it is true, for example, that
foreign policy sanctions are successful, by some measure, only about 20
percent of the time. Is that the same success rate as would occur without
sanctions, twice the rate, four times the rate, or half the rate? We simply
cannot know from these scorecards, because of the way they are de-
signed. As a result, we have no basis to draw valid inferences about what
the success rate of diplomacy might be in a world without economic
sanctions.
2. Selection Bias
One of the foundational premises of logical inference based on sam-
pling a portion of a larger population (here, the population of all cases
where economic leverage is applied) is that the sample is random. As
Siegelman and Donohue have pointed out, a researcher who studies a
non-random subset of the universe of cases is "necessarily studying both
the selection mechanism and the underlying population of cases simulta-
neously... As an eminent statistician once wrote, 'If you catch fish with
a net having a 6-inch mesh, you are liable to formulate the hypothesis
that all fish are more than 6 inches in length.' ,88
Here, the scorecards under review are constructed to include only
cases which involve either the actual application of sanctions (in the case
of HSE, with six exceptions), 89 or the issuance of formal, publicized
of outcome. The "no-threat" baseline would represent the "y intercept" of this regression line.
None of the studies reviewed above has done this, however. HSE include only six threat
cases, see infra note 89, while BE and Sykes do not attempt to correlate outcomes with the
size of the threat or sanction. See supra note 74 (listing variables considered by BE and
Sykes).
87. See ECONOMIC STATECRAFT, supra note 13, at 123 (1985) ("The most common and
most serious shortcoming in most assessments of the utility of techniques of statecraft is fail-
ure to cast the analysis in comparative terms.").
88. Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The Selection of Employment Discrimination
Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects To Test The Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24
J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 429 (1995) (quoting Irving John Good, Fallacies, Statistical, 5 INTER-
NATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 292 (1968)).
89. It is hardly conceivable that this tiny sample encompasses the universe of threat-only
cases in the foreign policy realm over that period. The six threat-only cases are identified as
such by a "dash" notation in the "cost-to-target" column in Tables 4.3-4.7 of ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (2d ed.), supra note 1, at 84-90. The cases are: USSR v. Romania
(62-3); U.S., Canada v. South Korea (75-1); League of Nations v. Yugoslavia (21-1); League
v. Greece (25-1); Western Allies v. GDR (61-3); and U.S. v. El Salvador (87-3). This tiny
sample excludes even some of the more famous and overt threat cases, such as U.S. linkage of
China's Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status to improvement of China's human rights
record.
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threat (Sykes/BE/Charnovitz). 9° Largely excluded from the net are cases
where the sender quietly backs down or simply decides not to issue a
threat or open a public investigation, but nonetheless makes it clear to
the target that it finds the filing meritorious. Also excluded are cases
where the target. quietly accedes to the sender's minimal demands, be-
fore full formal adversarial processes commence. The former cases, I
would suggest, are minor failures: no public confrontation results, no
trade is restricted. The latter category excludes, by definition, all the
greatest successes of sanctions: cases where the sender's goals were
achieved without trade restriction or public confrontation." The practical
reasons for excluding quiet threat cases are clear and understandable:
such cases are hard to spot, and finding them would require an enormous
90. The Sykes/BE studies of trade policy sanctions include only those episodes in which
a section 301 case was filed and investigated or self-initiated by USTR, thereby excluding
most, if not all, cases involving only behind-the-scenes or tacit threats. Constructive Unilat-
eral Threats, supra note 2; Aggressive Unilateralism, supra note 2. Charnovitz likewise
chooses to examine only cases in which the U.S. formally "certified" another country, under
the Pelly Amendment, as undermining an international conservation agreement. Certification
is, of course, a very formal and public event. As Charnovitz observes, "a number of countries
took action following a threat of Pelly certification, and thus were never certified. These
,successes' are not tallied here." Analysis of the Pelly Amendment, supra note 80, at 141-42.
91. Indeed, threat cases are the "normal" sanctions scenario except where one or more
states miscalculate. As Eaton and Engers have observed, "In a world of perfect information,
senders never actually resort to punishing. If the measure works, the target shapes up in an-
ticipation. If not, the sender never threatens it initially. Hence, the very imposition of
measures means that something went awry: either the sender underestimated the target's cost
of compliance (and sanctions eventually fail), or the target underestimated the sender's re-
solve (and sanctions ultimately succeed). See Jonathan Eaton & Maxim Enger, Sanctions:
Some Simple Analytics, Papers and Proceedings of the 111 th Meeting of the American Eco-
nomics Association, New York, New York, Jan. 3-5, 1999, in 89 AM. ECON. REV. 409-10
(1999).
Two examples of successful quiet leverage may illustrate the point. The author, while
serving as Assistant General Counsel at USTR, led a U.S. delegation in negotiating a trade
agreement, which opened the Japanese market to over $400 million in exports of U.S. surimi
(a high-value processed fish product). That lucrative deal was negotiated without any public
threats, but with the aid of quite pointed and explicit private threats that both GATT litigation
and trade sanctions under section 301 would follow if the dispute was not resolved. This
"quiet episode" does not show up in any trade sanctions scorecard, but it stands as an une-
quivocal success story for the use of trade leverage.
In the realm of environmental policy, the United States obtained the cooperation of Pan-
ama, Honduras and Belize with the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission's dolphin
conservation program without formal Pelly certification, by simply writing a letter to these
governments, observing that their vessels were fishing in violation of the program and re-
minding the governments of U.S. policy of imposing trade sanctions on countries which allow
their vessels to undermine international fisheries conservation agreements. Likewise, the mere
threat of a Pelly certification was sufficient to persuade Ecuador to adopt a strict dolphin-safe
policy in order not to imperil its large shrimp trade with the United States. See Use and Abuse
of Trade Leverage, supra note 40, at 34, 53. Neither of these "quiet-threat" episodes, how-
ever, qualify for any existing scorecard.
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amount of rummaging through diplomatic history. The fact remains: a
very important subset of cases has been effectively excluded. The net
effect is to bias downward the measured success rate for sanctions, par-
ticularly for those sanctions with modest aims (trade policy,
environmental policy, and modest foreign policy goals) that are most
susceptible to quiet diplomacy.
3. Subjectivity Problems
By far the most frequent criticism of the HSE scorecard and, indeed,
scorecards generally, is the subjectivity often involved in "scoring" de-
pendent and independent variables (i.e. sanction effectiveness and the
putative causes thereof)." HSE try to measure the "effectiveness" of
sanctions by rating outcomes on a scale of 1 to 4, and by rating contri-
bution of sanctions to outcomes, also on a scale of 1 to 4.93 The resulting
scores for degree of success and degree of contribution are then multi-
plied to yield a score between 1 and 16, with overall scores greater than
9 rated a success. HSE also employ subjective scoring on the other side
of the equation to reflect factors thought to determine effectiveness:
warmth of prior relations between sender and target (scored 1 to 3), eco-
nomic health and stability of target(scored 1 to 3), cost to sender (scored
1 to 4), international cooperation with sender (scored 1 to 4).94
Where do these numbers come from? The scoring of such variables
requires highly subjective judgments on at least three levels: first, the
decision as to which case studies to report in the database; second, the
decision as to which passages from each case study to excerpt in the
two-or-three-page write-up of each case; and, third, the decision on the
"score" chosen to encapsulate such complex concepts as sanction suc-
cess, contribution to success, health and stability of the target, warmth of
prior relations, etc. Nowhere is the basis for any scoring disclosed to the
reader. Indeed, in some cases, the authors' very scanty excerpts reveal
contradictory assessments of sanction's success and/or contribution. 95
92. See Coercion and Communication, supra note 84, at 787; When Sanctions Make
Sense, ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 1985, at 59 ("the scoring [in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered]
is vague and multiplying the marks compounds any errors"); Olson, supra note 84, at 324
("brief discussion of... [the basis for HSE's subjective success scoring] leaves this reviewer
uncomfortable").
93. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (lst ed.), supra note 1, at 32-33.
94. See discussion supra notes 63 and 74.
95. Take case 74-1, which I chose at random by simply opening the HSE study and ex-
amining the first case I saw. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.), supra note 1, at
491-95. It involves U.S. sanctions against Turkey in the wake of the Turkish invasion of
Cyprus, 1974-78. HSE score the episode a failure for outcome (score of 1) and a failure for
contribution of sanctions (score of 1). This scoring is based on two case studies-one by
Keith R. Legg and another by Ali S. Karaosmanoglu- which, if anything, seem to support
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While laymen might assume that quantitative methods are being used to
determine the effectiveness of sanctions, the latter is not being measured
by econometrics. "Success" in each and every case-and therefore the
measured effectiveness of sanctions overall-is solely the result of val-
ues assigned to variables by the authors on the basis of their own
personal selection and reading of often divergent case histories.96
Compounding the problem of subjectivity (which might, in princi-
ple, be assumed randomly distributed) is the hazard of so-called
"experimenter effects": the tendency of experimenters to unconsciously,
yet systematically, skew observations in favor of what they believe is the
hypothesis being tested. Robert Rosenthal's landmark study documents
this tendency in a wide variety of contexts spanning the physical sci-
ences, biological sciences, and behavioral sciences-on matters ranging
from the observation of movements of earthworms to experiments in
telekinesis. 97 Abundantly documented even for the observation of seem-
ingly "objective" facts, experimenter (or expectancy) bias is particularly
the opposite conclusion. Legg is quoted opining that "the real effect.., of the embargo was to
prevent an alteration of the balance of forces in the Aegean Sea." And Karaosmanoglu reports
that "the embargo also did great harm to Turkey's armed forces." ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED (lst ed.), supra note 1, at 494. These assessments would suggest that, while
the sanctions may not have been effective in rolling back Turkey's gains, they made a quite
significant contribution to preventing or deterring further aggression by Turkey against the
sixty percent of the island that it did not then control. Such an outcome would hardly be con-
sidered a "failed" outcome for sanctions. Nor, I might add, do HSE provide any
documentation for their scoring of other variables: such as the prior state of relations between
the United States and Turkey (rated 3, the best possible) or the economic health and stability
of Turkey (rated 2 on scale of I to 3). Id. at 495. See, e.g., Case 85-1, U.S. v. South Africa
(apartheid), in which HSE offer three "assessments" by other authors that economic sanctions
against South Africa were effective and two suggesting that sanctions were ineffective. With-
out further explanation, HSE scored the case a failure. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED
(2d ed.), supra note 1, at 246-47.
Likewise, in Case 65-2, U.S. v. India (1965-67: Agricultural Priorities), in which the U.S.
used a threat of a cutoff of concessionary wheat shipments to India as leverage to persuade
India to undertake internal agricultural reform, HSE score the outcome a complete success
(score of 16), while citing Robert Paarlberg to the effect that "the food power advantage en-
joyed by the U.S. was not enough to produce total compliance with U.S. economic reform
demands, and it certainly was not sufficient to produce any visible gains for the U.S. in the
diplomatic realm..." ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (Ist ed.), supra note 1, at 407-
08.
96. Moreover, the impact of subjectivity is magnified by the fact that the authors elect to
multiply the outcome variable (I to 4) by the contribution variable (1 to 4). This means that
any "error" in assigning a value to, say, the contribution variable is magnified by a factor of
between I and 4, depending on how contribution is rated. The difference between a "success"
or "failure" of sanctions in the HSE model can turn entirely on the 1-point distinction they
choose to make either between a "minor" and a "modest" contribution or between a
"successful" and "somewhat successful" outcome.
97. Robert Rosenthal, EXPERIMENTER EFFECTS IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (Richard M.
Elliot ed., 1966).
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pronounced when observers are asked to cull through masses of data
and/or make judgments.98 As Rosenthal remarks, "It is difficult to avoid
the unconscious tendency to reject for good reason data which may
weaken a hypothesis while uncritically accepting those data which
strengthen it."99 As the author elsewhere remarks, "[t]o the observing
scientist, hypothesis is both friend and enemy.' '.. °
The specter of experimenter effects haunts the HSE study from first
to last. It arises most clearly from the plain fact that the experimenters
(HSE) do all of the subjective scoring, including the definition of suc-
cess itself, while making no systematic effort to control for possible
biases in their selection of cases, selection of case studies, selection of
excerpts from case studies, or scoring of variables. 0 '
Of course, it will never be possible to eliminate all subjectivity in the
study of history, and subjectivity equally plagues non-quantitative his-
torical analyses. But quantitative studies carry the authority that
numbers-with their appearance of objectivity-intrinsically command
with the public.' ° In view of that fact, scorecard compilers should take
special pains to clearly acknowledge the presence of subjective judg-
ments where they exist, document the range of plausible estimates of the
various variables, and provide an analysis of the sensitivity of the results
to alternative scorings of variables. And qualitative studies-case histo-
ries-should be much more carefully peer reviewed for "experimenter
bids" and further steps taken to minimize bias.' °3
4. Proxy Problems
,While HSE collide headlong with subjectivity dilemmas, the BE and
Sykes studies attempt to sidestep them by employing objective proxies
for all independent variables (though measurement of the dependent
variable, success, remains a subjective assessment of the authors).'°4 For
example, the credibility of U.S. sanctions threats (an obviously relevant
variable) is measured in the BE study by a dummy variable which takes
the value 1 if the U.S. pre-sanction trade pattern is between $10 million
98. See id. at 19.
99. Id. at 25 (quoting S.S. Kety, Biochemical Theories of Schizophrenia, Part 1, 129 Sci-
ENCE 1529 (1959)).
100. Id. at 4 (quoting E.G. Boring, Newton and The Spectral Lines, 136 SCIENCE 601
(1962)).
101. See supra discussion accompanying notes 52-71.
102. See Porter, TRUST IN NUMBERS, supra note 51.
103. See Part III infra for a discussion of additional approaches to managing subjectivity
problems in case studies as well as scorecards.
104. Aggressive Unilateralism, supra note 2, at 697; Constructive Unilateral Threats,
supra note 2, at 318 (listing criteria as column headings in tbl.).
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and $100 million, and zero otherwise.' 5 Another variable used as a
proxy for credibility is whether or not the sanctions episode occurred
after the September 1985 Trade Policy Action Plan or after the 1988
Competitiveness Act (both "get-tough" signals to foreign govern-
ments).' °6
All these independent variables have the distinct advantage of being
objectively measurable. The problem, however, is that none of these
proxies is a particularly good measure of credibility of threat. The notion
that credibility increases markedly at the point where the magnitude of
pre-sanction trade reaches $10 million and then falls off sharply at trade
levels over $100 million must, as hypotheses go, be considered specula-
tive at best. So is the hypothesis that credibility increased and remained
high after the 1985 Action Plan and after the 1988 Competitiveness Act:
even if those trigger events brought a short-term spike in credibility of
sanctions, their continuing relevance in later years is not obvious and is
never demonstrated.
Proxies that do not necessarily track the variable they stand for pose
an inevitable dilemma of interpretation: is the measured regression coef-
ficient an indicator of the contribution of that variable to outcomes, or is
the coefficient simply a measure of the correspondence (or lack thereof)
between the proxy and the thing it supposedly approximates?' 7 The still
unmet challenge in the sanctions realm is to find reliable, objective
proxies for the key variables-such as threat credibility and target state
political resistance to pressure-that need to be measured (or estimated)
in each case. Until that challenge is met, quantitative studies will have to
continue to rely on subjective scoring of ordinal factors, raising prob-
lems of subjectivity and bias.
5. The Difficulty of Defining the Temporal
Boundaries and Baselines
Suppose for the sake of argument that one could find reliable meas-
ures for all relevant variables. Unfortunately, the analytical problem
would still not be solved. A further difficulty arises from the problem of
defining the boundaries of sanctions "episodes"-which spawns, in turn,
a corollary dilemma affecting the definition of a "successful" episode.
105. The idea is that small cases (below $10 million pre-sanctions trade in the product
being complained of) are less credible predicates for retaliation because the U.S. government
is simply less concerned with them, while very large pre-sanctions trade flows are also less
credible situations for retaliations because in those cases the U.S. will fear counter-retaliation
against U.S. exports. See Aggressive Unilateralism, supra note 2, at 698-700.
106. See id. at 698-704.
107. For a discussion of the problems caused by errors in variables, see PRACTICING
ECONOMETRICS, supra note 50, at 459-62.
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To understand these problems and their intricate inter-relation, con-
sider Charnovitz's study of 14 "episodes" in which trade sanctions were
threatened under the Pelly Amendment in order to induce a foreign
country to comply with an international conservation agreement.' 8 Eight
of these cases, it turns out, involved disputes over whaling activities un-
der the International Whaling Convention, of which four separate
episodes (in Charnovitz's tally) involved Norway.' °9 Should these be
tallied as eight cases, five cases, or one? Likewise, four of Charnovitz's
"episodes" involved disputes between the United States and Taiwan and
Korea, respectively, over their failure to enforce the General Assembly
driftnet ban."0 Should these be tallied as four cases, two cases, or one? In
the tuna-dolphin controversy (which Charnovitz omits from his data-
base) the U.S. imposed tuna import embargoes against one or more
countries on at least 34 separate occasions."' All of these 34 embargo
actions arose from a single law affecting a single issue in relation to a
single problem; and the outcome of each embargo action affected the
response of both sender and targets in other cases involving the tuna-
dolphin regime.' 2 If one is concerned with measuring the batting average
of U.S. sanctions or threats in artificially isolated diplomatic face-offs
with individual countries, then it may make sense to treat each separate
confrontation as a distinct episode. But if one is concerned, as policy-
makers ought to be, with understanding the contribution of sanctions (or
threats) to the formation, growth and effectiveness of cooperative re-
gimes, then it seems clear that the experience of each separate regime
should be tallied as one case, with the success of trade leverage meas-
ured strategically in terms of its contribution to the formation and
effectiveness of the regime overall."3
Consider, for example, the case of the International Whaling Com-
mission (IWC)." 4 It is by now well-established through case studies that
108. Analysis of the Pelly Amendment, supra note 80.
109. See Aggressive Unilateralism, supra note 2, at 763-72.
110. See id. at 764-73.
111. See National Marine Fisheries Service, Import Prohibition of Tuna and Tuna
Products, unpublished tabulation provided to the author by NMFS (available on request).
112. See Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage, supra note 40, at 30-49.
113. Actually, one might sub-divide the tuna-dolphin history into two cases, because
U.S. objectives dramatically shifted in 1992, from inducing fishers to diligently release dol-
phin encircled in the process of catching tuna to a goal of ending encirclement of dolphins
altogether. The latter objective was fundamentally different, and orders of magnitude more
difficult to achieve than the former, for a host of reasons explained in Use and Abuse of Trade
Leverage, supra note 40, at 46-51.
114. For an excellent account of the events underlying this example see David D. Caron,
The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission:
The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 154 (1995).
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U.S. trade leverage played a significant role (along with world opinion
and diplomatic pressure) in obtaining and enforcing, for a number of
years, a world-wide moratorium on commercial whaling."5 It is also es-
tablished that the moratorium has been honored by all nations (at least
publicly) as regards endangered or threatened stocks, but that a few
states (notably Norway, Iceland and Japan) have refused to continue to
abide by the moratorium as applied to plentiful minke stocks." 6 How
does one score "success" in this case? Was U.S. leverage unsuccessful
because it failed to deter Japan and Norway, in certain cases, from en-
gaging in de facto commercial whaling? Or was it successful to the
extent that it reduced Japanese and Norwegian take from what it would
otherwise be, persuaded them. to accept observers to monitor compli-
ance, focused their efforts on clearly non-endangered species, and
deterred other states from whaling at all? Conversely, suppose the threat
of trade sanctions persuaded Norway on one occasion to abstain from all
whaling, but so angered Norwegian authorities in the process that they
later decided to leave the IWC and form their own whaling regime, tak-
ing other IWC members with them. Should the episode which stopped
Norwegian whaling short-term but triggered a long-term fission in the
regime still be called a "success"?
Consider also the case of intellectual property protection prior to ne-
gotiation of the Uruguay Round agreements." 7 Suppose the United
States brings two highly publicized Section 301 cases against, say,
China and Korea, respectively, in response to their failure to protect in-
tellectual property rights to the satisfaction of the United States. Let us
further suppose, hypothetically, that Korea and China are defiant, but
twenty other nations of significant economic interest to the United States
(including all the rest of the Asian states) scurry to establish intellectual
property protection regimes to head off U.S. pressure. The Hufbauer and
Schott approach (and the Sykes and Bayard/Elliott scorecards) would
score this as two failures, no successes-since victories won without an
overt confrontation generally do not enter the database."' Suppose next
115. See id. at 157.
116. See id. at 159-63.
117. For a general account of the events underlying this stylized hypothetical see C.
O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade Organiza-
tion Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209, 225-37 (1997) (showing
that the main benefit of individual Section 301 cases brought against countries which failed to
pass or enforce intellectual property rights (IPR) protection laws derived, not from the success
of the bilateral negotiations themselves, but from the contribution of continued bilateral trade
pressure to acceptance of IPR as a suitable topic for Uruguay Round negotiation and agree-
ment, largely on U.S. terms).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
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that Korea and China capitulate, but that twenty other nations do nothing
and USTR decides it lacks the resources to chase them all down. This
outcome is scored as two successes, no failures. Suppose, finally, that
USTR brings five Section 301 cases, fails to win meaningful conces-
sions in any of them, but creates enough turmoil that a world-wide
comprehensive agreement on intellectual property is reached in, say, the
Uruguay Round. Scoring under the scorecard approach: five failures, no
successes. Yet few would dispute the contribution of trade leverage to
the cause of intellectual property rights protection in such a scenario.
What these examples demonstrate is that scorecard approaches fo-
cused on tactical face-offs suffer from the same deficiencies that afflict
bean-counting measures of 'enforcement' which look only at the number
of enforcement actions taken in any given year. "9 These approaches treat
all cases as equally significant and simply count the number of tactical
victories. In fact, the effectiveness of enforcement is more properly
measured by the degree to which overall compliance is enhanced by the
enforcement actions that are taken. Likewise for sanctions: the outcomes
of highly publicized individual face-offs will affect the evolution of
practice, but these face-offs do not define, and their outcomes do not
approximate, the contribution of sanctions to the formation and success
of international regimes.
6. Model Mis-specification
A sixth challenge for scorecards and case studies alike is in identi-
fying the right model for analysis. This entails at least three
considerations: (a) choosing the "right" factors to measure; (b) finding
the right functional form of the equation (i.e. specifying the inter-
relationships among the variables); and (c) finding observable variables
that serve as valid measures or proxies for those factors. The last consid-
eration, measurement, is the special problem of the quantitative
empiricist. The first two considerations, however, are generic to all
studies of sanctions including case studies. They require that studies be
informed by a clear, cogent, and reasonably comprehensive theory of
behavior. One key limitation of the current scorecards and case studies
alike is their lack of grounding in such a theory-a lack that reveals it-
self most clearly in the form of omitted variables and incorrect equations
(in the case of quantitative studies) and analytically inconsistent or
partial analyses in case studies.
119. See U.S. EPA, ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1990'S PROJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM
THE ANALYTICAL WORK GROUPS (1991) cited in Peter J. Fontaine, Multimedia Enforcement
Strategy: The Struggle to Close the Environmental Compliance Circle, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 31, 59 (1993).
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(a) Omitted variables. A key element of any empirical investigation
into cause and effect relationships is to identify the "independent" or
"causal" variables to be considered. 20 In the case of quantitative studies,
the consequences of so-called over-specification, i.e., including extrane-
ous variables, are relatively benign: the resulting estimate will be
unbiased but less efficient (displaying a higher variance) than if a leaner
specification had been chosen.' 21 Much more serious is the consequence
of omitting a variable that is in fact relevant. Omitted variables that cor-
relate with an included variable will bias the estimated coefficients of
the included variable. This means they will yield "inaccurate" estimates
of the degree of correlation between right-side and left-side variables-
e.g. between cost of sanctions to target and sanction effectiveness.
Moreover, if significance tests are applied, the inaccurate estimate may
appear more "statistically significant" than it really is. 22 In other words,
the estimate will be both wrong and speciously "precise." It is important,
therefore, that econometric models be based on a credible ex ante theory
that specifies a complete and plausible set of independent variables to
measure.
A logical place to look for a model to use in measuring sanctions ef-
fectiveness is in International Relations (IR) theory.'23 In recent years,
political scientists and international lawyers have formed a partnership
of sorts in exploring the larger question of why nations cooperate (or fail
to cooperate)-an inquiry which logically subsumes the question of the
role of economic leverage in producing cooperation.' 24 Although IR the-
ory has not yet produced an explicit model for use in explaining
sanctions outcomes, it has identified a number of other factors-
cognitive, moral, institutional, material and individual-which work
alongside, and in interaction with, leverage in shaping state behavior.'
25
A logical starting point for empirical analysis, then, would be to identify
120. See PRACTICING ECONOMETRICS, supra note 50, at 341-48.
121. See id. at 308-09, 312.
122. See id. at 312; William H. Greene, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 402-04 (3d ed. 1997)
[hereinafter ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS].
123. For an excellent, though densely written, overview of IR theory see Andreas Ha-
senclever et al., THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 134 (1997) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES].
124. This inter-disciplinary collaboration is well reviewed in Anne-Marie Slaughter et
al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdiscipli-
nary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998).
125. See INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 123; see also Oran R. Young & Gail
Osherenko, Testing Theories of Regime Formation: Findings from a Large Collaborative
Research Project, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 223, 241 (Volker
Rittberger ed., 1993) (identifying knowledge-based, interest-based, power-based, leadership,
and contextual factors).
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the leverage and non-leverage ("management") factors that IR theory has
found relevant to the cooperation dynamic and try to account for these
factors in analyses aimed at "isolating" the role of economic leverage.
None of the existing scorecards do this, however. HSE seem to rely
on native intuition in forming hypotheses and choosing variables to test
in regression equations.'26 BE announce that their selection of variables
is drawn from McMillan's game theoretic analysis of the sanctions bar-
gaining structure.'27 However, as will be seen below, their model does
not reflect all the variables that game theory would suggest, and game
theory itself (it will be seen) offers only a partial view of the forces that
shape behavior in the international realm.
In any sanctions "game" there is an ex ante matrix that reflects for
each player the "payoff' associated with cooperate and defect outcomes,
respectively. The premise of sanctions is that the ex ante game from the
standpoint of the target is a "suasion" game in which the dominant strat-
egy for the target is to "defect" (i.e. not cooperate with the sender), even
in an iterated game. The purpose of the sanctions threat is to alter the
perceived payoff structure of the target so that the target state's
"cooperate" strategy dominates the "defect" strategy (at least condition-
ally).128
From this game theory model, it follows straightforwardly that the
success of a sanctions threat in accomplishing that goal, prior to imposi-
tion of sanctions, will depend on: (a) the expected economic and
political impact of the sanction threatened; (b) the credibility of the
threat; and (c) the target's appraisal of the net economic and political
cost of cooperating on the minimum terms sufficient to ward off sanc-
tions. 29 After sanctions are imposed, threat magnitude is replaced by
actual economic and political impact. And threat credibility gives way to
a new variable: the target's perception of (a) the probability that sanc-
tions will continue or expand if the target continues to resist and (b) the
expected consequences of such continuance or enlargement.'" From a
126. See ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.), supra note 1, at 33-39, where
authors set forth the independent variables that comprise their "model" without reference to a
single outside theory, model or authority other than their own.
127. Aggressive Unilateralism, supra note 2, at 691-92.
128. See INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 123, at 50-51.
129. By "net cost" I mean the cost net of any expected "intrinsic" benefits of coopera-
tion. "Intrinsic" benefits are benefits of cooperation other than those which arise simply from
the non-application or lifting of sanctions.
130. For example, I have shown that the actual economic impact of the U.S. primary
embargo on tuna imports in the tuna-dolphin case was significantly enhanced by target-state
fears of (a) extension of U.S. import restrictions to shrimp (in the case of Ecuador) or (b) the
closure of major European tuna markets in response to continued destruction of the dolphin
stocks. See Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage, supra note 40, at 36.
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game-theoretic perspective, then, these are the variables that must be
approximated in modeling the determinants of sanction effectiveness.
Neither BE nor HSE actually model these variables, however. As
seen earlier, threat magnitude and credibility are poorly approximated
by the BE study and completely ignored in HSE."' Nor do these score-
cards capture variations in political costs of sanctions to sender and
target."' In fact, these scorecards do not even provide a reliable index of
economic impact, a variable which turns out to be surprisingly difficult
to measure. 33 Most of all, current studies ignore the effect of variations
131. See supra Part II.B.1.
132. Political costs of sanctions to the target arise from the stigma associated with
highly public accusations of malfeasance by another state and any tendency of those who feel
the impact of sanctions to blame the government for incurring them. The significance of these
costs will depend, in turn, on the degree of political influence of those who are targeted by
sanctions and impute such blame-another case-specific variable. Sanctions may also, how-
ever, produce political benefits to the target to the extent that they serve as a rallying point for
mobilizing public support against "foreign interference" or serve as a handy scapegoat for
economic woes that arise from other sources, including the government's own mismanage-
ment of the economy. See, e.g., Kittredge Testimony, supra note 9. Thus, the net political cost
of sanctions to targets will depend on which effect predominates in a particular case an em-
pirical question which requires close analysis of each case.
Contrary to the authors' implication, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (2d ed.), su-
pra note 1, at 49, HSE's distinction between "major" and "modest" policy changes does not
faithfully proxy the political-cost-to-target variable, particularly inasmuch as goals as dispa-
rate (yet significant) as nuclear non-proliferation and release of dissidents appear to have been
lumped in with goals such as rolling back the price of copper by two cents, under the category
of "modest policy change." Id. at 41-42, 399-402.
Political costs of sanctions to sender might be expected to include the resentment of allies
and tarnished reputation as a reliable trading partner, weighed against the perceived benefits
of establishing the credibility of threats in future cases. It is not unusual for national security
and trade policy disputes to implicate interests that have powerful cultural and symbolic reso-
nance as well. For example, the Japan rice case (because of historic "national security"
concerns and, more plausibly, the symbolism of rice in Japanese culture) raised barriers to
agreement that went well beyond the economic stakes involved. See Dale E. Hathaway, AG-
RICULTURE AND THE GATT: REWRITING THE RULES, 20 INST. INT'L ECON. 1, 28-30, 78-81,
(1987); see also James R. Moore, Unlocking the Japanese Rice Market: How Far Will the
Door be Opened?, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 273, 276 (1996).
133. Economic impact depends on (1) the kind of sanction chosen (for example, supplies
of concessionary aid and credit are going to be harder to replace from other sources than im-
port or export markets); (2) the scope and magnitude of the sanction; (3) the level of
enforcement of sanctions; (4) the duration of the sanction; (5) the degree of target state de-
pendence on the thing sanctioned (imports, exports, aid, credit); (6) the availability of
substitute supplies of the thing sanctioned (imports, exports, aid, credit) from other foreign
sources; and (7) the terms on which alternative sources of supply or markets are available. All
these variables are crucially important in determining economic impact. And all, clearly, are
highly case-specific. Of particular importance, and often overlooked, is the last factor-terms
of replacement. As both the tuna-dolphin and South African sanctions episodes suggest, eco-
nomic sanctions may have considerable impact even when alternative supplies are readily
available if the cost of embargo circumvention through trans-shipment or smuggling is sig-
nificant. See Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage, supra note 40, at 36 (tuna-dolphin);
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in target-state-perceived cost of compliance-even though theory and
common sense suggest that cost-of-compliance perceptions play a major
role in target state decision-making.
I have discussed, so far, only the variables indicated by game theory,
which makes a host of unrealistic simplifying assumptions: it assumes
that state preferences are exogenously given, rationally determined, and
fixed (apart from external inducements) in the mind of a unitary and sin-
gle-minded state. But most international theorists and policy-makers
recognize that these assumptions are much too restrictive: ideas, domes-
tic and trans-national discourse, "epistemic communities," and political
factions are all understood to play crucial roles in shaping each state's
perceptions of what its own preferences are. 3 4 In practice, cognitive
factors largely determine not only what state preferences are, but how
strongly state preferences are held, the sacrifices that will be accepted in
the interest of vindicating them, the degree of leverage that is mobilized
on behalf of a sanctions threat, the credibility of the threat, the perceived
costs of cooperation and/or defection by the target state, and the degree
of suasion (leverage) needed to get the target state to cooperate.35 Cog-
nitive factors may also shape the terms of cooperation ultimately
negotiated between sender and target. In fact, the very premise of the
EMBARGO: APARTHEID'S OIL SECRETS REVEALED 197-98 (Richard Hengeveld et al., eds.,
1955) (South Africa).
Studies which omit to measure one or more of these variables potentially will miss im-
portant explanations of success or failure. For example, failure to examine level of
enforcement and terms of replacement will render the analyst unable to distinguish between
cases in which sanctions fail because the target state lacks sufficient unilateral leverage and
those which fail because the sender state is not particularly committed to sanctions and makes
little effort to enforce them (perhaps because Congress imposes them on a reluctant execu-
tive). While both situations may lead to sanction failure or diminished contribution to success,
they carry very different implications for policy.
134. "Cognitive" theory broadly encompass a range of theories focusing on the process
by which state preferences are determined. For an excellent and comprehensive review of
cognitive theory see INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 123, at 133-210. See also Peter M.
Haas, Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International Environmental Co-
operation, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 168 (Volker Rittberger ed.,
1993) (focusing on the role of trans-national groups of like-minded experts in shaping na-
tional preferences regarding cooperation).
135. Of course, the influence of cognitive factors will depend not only on the beliefs of
the ultimate decision-makers but on domestic political structures in the states involved. A
more de-centralized governance structure will increase the number of official actors
(provinces, agencies, branches of government) whose beliefs directly influence state behavior.
Also, more accountable states will tend to give greater weight to public and special interest
views than, say, oligarchies and dictatorships. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal Inter-
national Relations Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
717, 728 (stating that one premise of "Liberalism" is that "[sitate preferences are derivative of
individual and groups preferences, but depend crucially on which individuals and groups are
represented.")
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USA*Engage initiative-which seeks to change Congress's thinking
about the utility of economic sanctions through argument, public pres-
sure, and analysis-clearly recognizes the role of cognitive factors in
shaping the behavior of sending states. There is no reason to assume
such factors less significant at the target state level. Yet cognitive factors
make no appearance in current scorecards.
36
One cognitive factor of considerable importance involves what
Thomas Franck calls "the power of legitimacy.' 37 The idea is simple:
rules or norms that are widely perceived as "legitimate" will have greater
intrinsic compliance pull than rules or norms which are not so per-
ceived. 38 As a result, sanctions mobilized in support of legitimate rules
and norms are more likely to succeed than sanctions whose goals are
dismissed as illegitimate by the target and/or key third-party actors-
other things being equal. Likewise, sanctions that are seen as
"legitimate" means to an end are more likely to succeed than otherwise
equivalent sanctions which are widely viewed as simple "bullying" by
the sender.' So legitimacy matters. Yet no viable measure of either goal
legitimacy or means-end legitimacy appears in the HSE study.40
136. In the realm of sanctions employed to conserve the commons-e.g., efforts to pro-
tect the ozone layer, international fish stocks, endangered species-a quite different set of
cognitive factors come into play. Here, the relevant factors are factors such as: the degree of
consensus on the risk being addressed (ozone depletion, species extinction, etc.), the priority
assigned to that risk, knowledge of alternatives to risk-causing activities, and appreciation of
the costs and side-effects of such alternatives. Influencing these key cognitive variables are a
range of subsidiary and contextual factors such as: the number and influence of environmental
NGOs in the country in question; the size, sophistication and political influence of environ-
mental ministries; the personal predilections of key leaders; and the nature and quality of
discourse aimed at enhancing understanding of risks and risk-avoidance options. For an in-
depth discussion of the nature and interaction of these diverse factors in the environmental
realm, see Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage, supra note 40.
137. Thomas M. Franck, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990)
[hereinafter LEGITIMACY].
138. See id. at 25-26.
139. For example, sanctions against South Africa under apartheid and against Saddam
Hussein in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War enjoyed a much greater legitimacy
worldwide than sanctions against Castro's Cuba. As a result, more countries cooperated with
Iraqi and South African sanctions and the moral and material impact on the target states was
correspondingly enhanced.
140. HSE do include two scaled variables-degree of international cooperation with
sender, and international assistance to target-each of which might be said to reflect, in part,
the perceived legitimacy of the means and ends of sanctions. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECON-
SIDERED (2d ed.), supra note 1, at 44-45. Yet these measures fail to capture the legitimacy of
the means or ends of sanctions within the target country. Moreover, cooperation indices en-
compass not only considerations of legitimacy but all manner of other considerations such as
alliance politics, geography, and patterns of economic trade and dependence.
The closest the BE study comes to a proxy for legitimacy is their independent variable,
TOUGH, which takes the value I if an explicit threat is issued, or if GATT ruled against the
target, or if case is self-initiated; 0 otherwise. Aggressive Unilateralism, supra note 2, at 698.
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As seen, omitted variables are more or less harmless if they are en-
tirely uncorrelated with included independent variables as well as the
dependent variables: omitted variables of this kind will weaken the "fit"
of the regression by introducing unexplained variation, but they will not
bias the estimates.14' A key question, then, is whether the omitted vari-
ables in the HSE study would be expected to vary with included
variables, assuming reliable proxies for both could be found. In this
case, prevailing theories of international cooperation strongly suggest an
affirmative answer.
For example, the omitted target-state cost-of-cooperation variable
quite plausibly correlates with the cost of sanctions to target and cost of
sanctions to sender (two included variables). Reason: sender states will
anticipate that more onerous demands require larger threats and (if
threats fail) larger sanctions. Likewise, the omitted legitimacy variable is
likely to correlate (though imperfectly) with international cooperation with
sender, assistance to target, and cost to target (all included variables).
Cognitive factors on both sides are quite plausibly related to intensity of
preferences in target and sender states which will affect, in turn, the length
of the sanctions episode: longer episodes being associated with both more
The GATT ruling part of this measure might be taken as a rough proxy of perceived legiti-
macy of grievance in the trade policy setting. But the TOUGH variable is obviously
contaminated with two other criteria-explicit threat and self-initiated case-which may bear
on credibility but have little to do with legitimacy. Certainly if the concept of legitimacy is
defined strictly, the BE study contains no fair measure of legitimacy.
Sykes goes the furthest in including variables which might plausibly correlate with the le-
gitimacy of U.S. goals in trade disputes: whether or not the U.S. complaint involved an
alleged breach of a trade agreement, whether or not the agreement in question was ambiguous
on the issue in dispute; whether a dispute panel ruled on the issue; and whether or not the
ruling was favorable to the United States. Applying these variables reveals that the U.S. won
at least partial concessions in 31 of 35 concluded cases in which violation of an agreement
was alleged, and in 8 of 9 cases in which a dispute panel ruled in favor of the United States.
Constructive Unilateral Threats, supra note 2, at 311-12. However, he also observes that the
United States achieved at least partial success in at least 27 of 33 completed cases in which no
violation was alleged. Id. at 313-15. But it would be incorrect to infer from this that
"legitimacy does not matter." The surprising success rate in "illegitimate" cases may reflect
the weakness of the legitimacy variable. Or it may reflect the fact that, as Sykes observes,
virtually all of these cases involved allegations of unfair practices in fields such as services,
investment and intellectual property that were not covered by the GAT'T, one way or the
other, at the time of the action. Id. at 298, 305. Threatened sanctions, in the context of such
gaps of coverage, might be thought to be at least semi-legitimate, self-help substitutes for
multilateralism. Under these circumstances, the only fair conclusion is that the power of le-
gitimacy remains untested in the trade policy realm. Testing the power of legitimacy in trade
relations would require that the United States bring section 301 actions involving complaints
about practices that are authorized by the WTO-and, for comparison's sake, bring a series of
cases that are not so authorized. The results-provided other factors could be accounted for-
would suggest the power of legitimacy in the trade policy realm.
141. See discussion supra Part II.B.6a.
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determined sanctioners and more determined target states. Because
omitted variables are plausibly correlated with included variables in the
HSE study, there is prima facie reason to believe that their
"measurements" of cause and effect relationships are both biased and
speciously precise.
Lesson: econometric regression is no substitute for rigorous, theo-
retically well-grounded explanatory models. In fact, the former requires
the latter.
(b) Omitted Interaction Terms. Suppose you were investigating the
causes of fire using econometric techniques. If you followed the HSE
approach you would plug in separate variables representing (a) a spark,
(b) dry kindling, and (c) oxygen. 1 ' Assuming these variables are ran-
domly distributed with respect to each other-that is to say, the presence
of a spark does not affect the likelihood of kindling, which in turn does
not affect the likelihood of oxygen being present-you might get a
rather low correlation between each of these individual variables and
fire. The occurrence of at least one of the above variables would result in
fire only about 1 in 8 times. However, if you were to insert interaction
terms into your equation-combinations of kindling-spark, spark-
oxygen, and kindling-oxygen-you would get higher correlations. If you
inserted a term representing the combination of spark, dry kindling, and
oxygen your measured correlation would be nearly perfect. To arrive at
the "right" result about the causes of fire, one has to insert a term (test a
hypothesis) which reflects physical reality: fires are caused by a
combination of circumstances-kindling, spark, oxygen-occurring si-
multaneously. 43
This simple example illustrates a further difficulty in the HSE and
BE analyses. They failed to test for the possibility (indeed, if theory is
correct, the near certainty) of interaction effects. "Successful" sanctions
would seem to require the simultaneous occurrence of a combination of
circumstances: in simplest terms, (a) a credible threat of (b) costs that are
greater than (c) the cost of compliance with the sender's demands. The
effect of a sanction costing $1 million per year depends crucially on
whether the contemporaneous cost of complying with the sender demand
is $500,000 or $1.5 million. The threat of a $1 million sanction linked to
compliance costing $500,000 may be expected to produce quite different
results, depending on whether the target believes that defying the sender
will produce a 70 percent, 50 percent, or 30 percent chance of such
142. See equation specified in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (Ist ed.), supra
note 49, at 99-100.
143. See ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS, supra note 122, at 387-88; I am indebted to Peter
Siegelman for this example.
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sanctions being imposed. The key term is, in each case, the ratio of cost
of sanctions to cost of compliance, multiplied by the probability of
sanctions. Of course, each of these factors-credibility, magnitude of
costs threatened, perceived costs of capitulation-may implicate a host
of subsidiary factors which can exist in a wide variety of combina-
tions.'" The point is that successful outcomes are caused by
combinations and interactions of factors, including sanctions where they
are used, not by any single factor acting alone.14 Because HSE and BE
failed to take account of variable costs of compliance with sender de-
mands, they were obviously unable to test the very plausible and
important hypothesis that effectiveness depends on the ratio, perceived
by the target between expected sanctions impact and costs of compli-
146
ance.
7. Problems of Endogeneity
Econometric models of the kind used by HSE and BE require the
implicit assumption that the "independent" variables on the right hand
side of the equation (x,,x 2,x3,. . . ) influence the "endogenous" variable
(y) and not the other way around. 47 Problems of endogeneity arise when
this condition is violated. The consequences are serious: biased esti-
mates, invalid standard errors (i.e. erroneous estimates of "significance")
even, possibly, the wrong sign on the independent variable-if, for ex-
ample, the actual effect of y on x is greater than the other way around.'
4 8
144. The credibility variable, for example, might be expected to implicate at the least the
following prior factors: expected cost of sanctions to sender, intensity of relative sender and
target state preferences, expectation of international cooperation with sanctions. The magni-
tude-of-costs-threatened variable likewise implicates a host of prior variables (e.g. intensity of
sender state preferences, sender state estimation of the size of a "proportional" threat in rela-
tion to the matter at issue, prior target-sender economic relations, degree of international
cooperation with target/sender, perceptions of legitimacy, degree of sender state and/or inter-
national enforcement of sanctions, perceived cost of, etc.). The cost-of-compliance variable
would be expected to implicate both the economic and the perceived political costs-from the
target state's perspective-of complying with the sender state demands, but appraisal of these
costs would turn a range of antecedent cognitive factors of the kind described earlier.
145. To take a very obvious example, we would expect a priori that cases involving the
combination of highly credible, costly-to-target sanctions aimed at achieving a relatively
modest (politically or economically inexpensive) policy change would produce a much higher
likelihood of success than cases involving only one of these favorable circumstances. Favor-
able combinations of variables produce synergies of effect that cannot be captured by simple
linear models of the kind used by HSE.
146. As Baldwin has emphasized, it is necessary to adjust for the difficulty of the goal
(i.e. target state costs of compliance) in each case when tallying the successes and failures of
economic sanctions. ECONOMIC STATECRAFr, supra note 13, at 133.
147. See ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS, supra note 122, at 712-14;
148. See id.
[Vol. 21:235
The Problem with Scorecards
Problems of endogeneity are rife in the HSE and BE models and in
the task of analyzing sanctions-backed bargaining generally. To see
them, suppose we are trying to estimate the probability that, faced with a
sanctions threat, the target will comply with the basic (bottom-line) de-
mands of the sender. That probability of compliance (P ) is going to
depend, in part, on the target's perception of the likelihood that the
sender will impose sanctions if compliance is withheld, EP,. But E,P,, in
turn, will depend on the sender's estimation of the likelihood that the
target will give in to a threat. Call that estimate E.P. to indicate that it
represents the sender's estimate of PC. Assuming there is a significant
correlation between E Pc and PC and between E,P. and Ps-i.e. assuming
senders and targets are not completely ignorant of each other's expecta-
tions-we have an endogeneity problem. The probability of compliance
depends in part on the credibility of the threat. But the credibility of the
threat depends in part on the sender's perception of the probability of
compliance.
Nor does the problem end once sanctions are imposed, for at each
decision moment after imposition of sanctions, the calculation of EP, by
targets continues, this time applied to the likelihood of sanctions per-
sisting, expanding, or being repealed if the target remains defiant. In
fact, one entirely predictable consequence of the USA*Engage reform
(which calls for continuing review of sanctions and repeal of
"ineffective" measures) will be to encourage future targets in the belief
that their continued resistance to pressure will be rewarded by U.S. re-
treat. This will further diminish the credibility of sanctions threats
encourage target state resistance to sanctions, and thereby fulfill the
prophecy of critics who claim that sanctions are ineffective and should
not be applied.
49
The cat is chasing its tail, and that chase has important ramifications
for both sanctions scholarship and for policy. For scholarship, it means
that sophisticated techniques must be used to account for the feedback
between sender state expectations and target state behavior-techniques
not employed by HSE and which require certain conditions that may not
be met here.'5° For policy, the endogeneity problem means that public
149. There are further problems of endogeneity in the HSE model. For example, HSE
model duration as a determinant of success rates when, in fact, success reciprocally deter-
mines the duration of sanctions: successful sanctions presumably are lifted once their goals
are achieved. HSE's "insight" that sanctions work quickly if they are going to work
(Commandment Number 4), ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.), supra note 1, at
86, may actually reflect nothing more than a statistical artifact: successful sanctions tend to be
shorter-lived than unsuccessful ones, because the successful episodes cause sanctions to end
sooner. Endogeneity produces, once again, a biased and speciously precise "explanation."
150. See PRACTICING ECONOMETRICS, supra note 50, at 581-609.
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analysis of the costs, impact and effectiveness of future sanctions
(accompanied by a strong presumption of repeal of ineffective sanctions)
is highly ill advised. It will alter the very thing being measured, and alter
it, furthermore, in a negative direction. If future aggressors and autocrats
know that all they have to do is survive one year of sanctions so as to
generate a negative cost-benefit analysis in the next annual review, that
will certainly give them a powerful incentive to hold out. Publicly an-
nouncing your cost-benefit estimate seems a lot like showing all your
cards in poker-and then stating your opinion about the strength of your
hand-while the wagering is still proceeding. Why would anyone in
their right mind do it? This does not mean that there can be no congres-
sional oversight of impact assessment and/or no public report. It simply
means that there should be no automatic presumption that an
"ineffective" assessment necessarily leads to repeal of sanctions (as op-
posed to alteration or escalation). And it means that the key facts and
factors that underlie the ultimate decision on sanctions should be kept
confidential-so that targets cannot game them. Sanctions analysis is
fundamentally an intelligence estimate and ought to be treated as such.'5'
8. Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity measures the degree to which one or more inde-
pendent variables (on the right hand side) are correlated with each other.
The effect of high multicollinearity on regression estimates is to distrib-
ute variation randomly across the collinear variables, causing correlation
between the dependent variable (here, sanctions effectiveness) and each
of the collinear right-side variables to appear weaker than it really is.'52
In the case of the HSE scorecard, the index of prior relations between
sender and target, cost of sanctions to target, and presanctions trade link-
age between target and sender countries and credibility of threat (where
such a measure is employed) might all be expected to display a certain
degree of collinearity. Since all these variables tend to move together it
is hard to sort out their independent effects. Multicollinearity may pro-
vide one explanation for the fact that only two of the 18 variables
employed in the HSE study are significant at the 95 percent confidence
151. Proponents of sanctions impact assessment defend the practice by analogy to envi-
ronmental impact assessment, which, of course, is done publicly. See Richard Haass, Vice
President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution, Lunch Address
at Symposium, Sanctions Reform? Evaluating the Economic Weapon in Asia and the World
hosted by GEO. J. LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. (Feb. 23, 2000). The analogy misses a crucial
difference: the environment cannot and will not alter its behavior on the basis of what the
environmental impact assessment says.
152. See PRACTICING ECONOMETRICS, supra note 50, at 435.
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level.'53 But it is not hard to see that the problem of collinearity is a con-
ceptual problem that confronts any analysis, even if it is not quantitative.
It is not escaped by confining one's efforts to case studies.
9. The Difficulty of Modeling Dynamic
Processes by Static Proxies
In the simplest terms, we would expect economic sanctions to suc-
ceed if they impose (or threaten) political and economic costs that are
greater than the costs of complying with the sender states' demands. But
neither the sender's demands, nor the target's perception of the threat,
the cost of sanctions or the "cost of compliance" are static. The sender
state's demands are subject to change through at least three possible
mechanisms-negotiation with the target, dialogue with other states, or
internal domestic discourse. Shifting demands will, in turn, shift the tar-
get state's "cost" of compliance with the sender's demands.14 Moreover,
the threat of sanctions typically spawns a domestic and trans-national
dialogue within the target state that shifts the "payoff matrix" of both
sender and target over time. '55
Likewise, the economic impact of sanctions is subject to evolution
over time in response to at least four factors: (1) primary sender states
may broaden or narrow the scope of sanctions over time; (2) interna-
tional cooperation with sanctions may wax or wane over time in
response to economic forces as well as dialogue among the lead sanc-
tioning state(s) and actual/potential cooperators; (3) black markets may
develop in sanctioned goods and services, the importance of which
depends in part on the ingenuity and unscrupulousness of producers and
in part on the vigor of national enforcement efforts; and (4) capital, labor
153. See ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.), supra note 49, at 99-100. The
variables, indicated by a T-statistic with an absolute value greater than 2 are: (1) use during
world war and (2) the amount of support received from third countries. See id.
154. This dynamic is documented in some detail in Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage,
supra note 40, at 63-73.
155. See id. at 60, 73. In the tuna-dolphin case, for example, U.S. tuna embargoes gen-
erated a dialogue about dolphin conservation options in Latin America and among Latin
American and U.S. governments, fishing fleets and environmental NGOs that had the effect
of fundamentally transforming both the magnitude and credibility of U.S. trade sanctions, the
demands supported by such sanctions, and the target state calculation of the cost of complying
with U.S. sanction demands. These sanctions-inspired cognitive shifts are documented in
detail in Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage, supra note 40, at 60, 73. Similarly, the "Helms-
Burton" sanctions, despite the outrage they provoked in foreign capitals, did inaugurate the
dialogue about proper and improper uses of expropriated property which has led directly to a
pathbreaking understanding with the European Union on investments in wrongfully expropri-
ated property. See Sanctions Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Rel. Comm., 108th
Cong. (1999) (statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Busi-
ness and Agricultural Affairs).
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and goods markets tend to adjust to sanctions over time, usually limiting
their economic impact.
1 56
Finally, the probability of sanctions in time 2 (and with it the tar-
get's anticipated cost of non-cooperation) is obviously influenced by
whether or not sanctions were imposed under "similar" circumstances in
time 1, and whether or not they "worked." Indeed, game theorists have
posited this inter-temporal and inter-case reputation concern as an im-
portant driver of behavior on the part of both senders and targets: targets
will evaluate the probability of sanctions according to the sender's
reputation for toughness based on the past behavior of the sender; while
senders evaluate the probability of success according to the target's
reputation for stubbornness based on past behavior of target.' 7 The static
scoring of variables in current scoreboards fails to capture this crucial
dynamic aspect.
10. Invalid Cross-tabs Comparisons
HSE do not rely on their quantitative regression results exclusively,
or even principally, in defending their "Nine Commandments" about the
use of trade sanctions. They also rely on a practice called cross-
tabulation, or "cross-tabs." This practice, as HSE apply it, involves com-
puting the average value of some independent variable for success cases,
and the average value of the same variable for failure cases, and drawing
general inferences from the comparison. 
5 8
For example, HSE note that the average "prior relations index" for
successful cases involving a modest policy change is 2.4 (on a scale
from 1 to 3), while the average prior relations index in failure cases is
2.0. From this the authors conclude: "Attack Your Allies, Not Your Ad-
versaries."'59 But is the difference between 2.0 and 2.3 a statistically
significant difference? HSE would have us assume it is, but offer no evi-
dence for the significance of the difference.
156. The dynamic character of the economic impact of sanctions in the tuna-dolphin
case is documented in Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage, supra note 40, at 34-36. HSE rec-
ognize the dynamic impact of sanctions via their assertion that the impact of foreign policy
sanctions is likely to wane over time. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (lst ed.), supra
note 49, at 86.
157. For a theoretical treatment of this dynamic, see Eaton & Engers, supra note 91, at
1, 3-5.
158. See ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (Ist ed.), supra note I at 82-91. Indeed,
the second edition of ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED dispenses with regression analy-
sis altogether and relies on cross-tabs exclusively. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (2d
ed.), supra note 1, at 91-114.
159. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (2d. ed), supra note 1, at 99-100.
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More fundamentally, HSE's use of cross-tabs-which entails draw-
ing categorical policy conclusions about the significance of a particular
variable in determining effectiveness from the average value of that
variable in "successful" and "failed" cases-seems to imply that other
factors are being held equal such that the effect of the variable in ques-
tion has been isolated. In fact, nothing else is being held equal in a cross-
tabs comparison because no regression has been performed. "Holding
other factors constant" to isolate the contribution of particular variables
to variations in success rates is precisely the job of multivariate regres-
sion analysis.' 6° Cross-tabs without regression leave wide open the
possibility that the discrepancy in success and failure rates might be at-
tributed to other factors entirely-such as the degree of prior trade
between sender and target-or combinations of factors which may acti-
vate or nullify the effects of the variable in question. In short, drawing
final conclusions from cross-tabs comparison is a very risky business.62
Yet virtually every one of their Nine Commandments are "supported" by
just such a static, bivariate comparison. 63
11. Data Problems
In principle, many of the problems discussed above can be solved by
examining more variables. However, the number of variables cannot be
greater than the number of observations or estimation becomes
technically impossible.' 6" Also, confidence intervals tend to get larger as
the number of coefficients being estimated approaches the number of
observations.165 HSE have observations of only about 100 "cases", and
install at least 18 terms in their equation (not counting the needed terms
that I argue that they omit). Moreover, the HSE database spans five quite
dissimilar foreign policy contexts (de-stabilization, military adventure
disruption, impairment of military potential, major policy change, and
modest policy change) each of which arguably follows a more or less
distinct political dynamic and should be modeled separately.
Subdividing the data base into these five major conceptual categories
would reduce the sample size even further-to an average of less than 20
160. PRACTICING ECONOMETRICS, supra note 50, at 202-04.
161. It may, of course, be true that allies are easier to sway through sanctions than ad-
versaries. But the cross-tab comparison provided by HSE does not prove it.
162. In practice, cross-tabs are quite useful, and are widely used by econometricians, as
a rough first guide to the data and as a device for generating hypotheses to test through regres-
sion. Because of the limitation reviewed above, they are not widely accepted, however, as a
basis for drawingfinal conclusions from data. See STATISTICS, supra note 50, at 47-48.
163. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (2d ed.), supra note 1, at 91-107.
164. See STATISTICS, supra note 50, at 493.
165. See id.
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cases per category. In short, there are simply too few cases in each
category-and too many variables-to permit the kind of quantitative
analysis that HSE engage in.
Beyond this basic, structural problem, scorecards suffer from an ad-
ditional problem arising from the quality of data in their database. The
sources of data for economic sanctions scorecards are obviously either
raw data or case studies of episodes in which economic sanctions have
been used, or not used, to accomplish various goals. Yet, as has been
seen, HSE provide no explication of the criteria they applied in choosing
authors, case studies, or excerpts from case studies; do not discuss the
factual foundation for the scores assigned; do not identify disagreements
among the case historians upon which they draw; and do not indicate the
sensitivity of their analysis to plausible alternative scorings.'6 6 What is
clear is that authors study cases for a wide range of purposes, only one
of which is analysis of the effectiveness of sanctions. Under these cir-
cumstances, it would be a serendipity, indeed, if the HSE database of
case studies turned out to be sufficiently standardized and rigorous to
supply truly reliable estimates for all variables that HSE measure, not to
mention the variables they omit to measure.161
166. See infra Part II.B.I; ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.), supra note
49, at 27-69 (discussion of methodology) and any of the case abstracts collected id. at 107-
753 (collection of case abstracts). In fairness to the authors, providing an analysis and discus-
sion of this kind would have added considerable length and complexity to an already
formidable undertaking. So be it. Methods, assumptions and sensitivity of results to variations
in assumptions need to be disclosed in any quantitative analysis that offers itself as a basis for
policy, be it a risk assessment or sanctions effectiveness scorecard. For recommendations of
the National Academy of Sciences see COMMITTEE ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS
POLLUTANTS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT
(1994).
167. At least case histories exist for foreign policy sanctions episodes. In fact, HSE have
done a great service by unearthing and collecting hundreds of these case histories, which they
report at the end of each case history in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.), supra
note 1, at 107-753; Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (2nd ed.), supra note 1, at 123-298;
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: SUPPLEMENTAL CASE HISTORIES, supra note 65. See
also case studies reported supra note 48. Trade policy and environmental policy sanctions are
much less studied. The most detailed case studies to date are Duncan Brack, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL xvii (1996) (discussing the stratospheric ozone
treaty), and Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage, supra note 40 (discussing tuna dolphin sanc-
tions). David Caron and M.J. Peterson have written on international efforts to obtain and
enforce a global moratorium on commercial whaling, without, however, focusing specifically
and systematically on the role of economic leverage. David D. Caron, The International
Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional
Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 154, 159-63 (1995); M.J.
Peterson, Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists and the International Management of
Whaling, 46 INT'L ORG. 147 (1992) (discussing the moratorium on whaling). The dearth of
detailed and focused empirical work on trade and environment episodes constitutes, in this
author's view, a serious impediment to both scholarship and policy in the field of trade and
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12. Invalid Extrapolation from Foreign
Policy to Environmental Sanctions
The last problem with scorecards to be discussed in this essay arises
not from the design of the scorecards themselves but from the use that
has been made of them. While HSE and other compilers of scorecards
have been quite scrupulous in limiting their insights to the policy realm
from which their data is drawn, others have not always been so careful.
In particular, the USA*Engage coalition distinguishes "high foreign
policy" from commercial sanctions (discouraging the former and not the
latter), but makes no distinction between foreign policy and environ-
mental sanctions. Its publications-and its draft legislation-lump
environmental sanctions into the same analytical pot as costly, ineffec-
tive foreign policy sanctions: facing an adverse presumption and
burdened with special procedural requirements.' 68 So do the public pro-
nouncements of the President's Export Council and the National
Association of Manufacturers. 169  Prominent scholars have likewise
treated environmental sanctions as if they are just a subset of foreign
policy sanctions, with the same dynamic and (low) probability of suc-
170
cess.
environment. It certainly impedes any effort to draw general conclusions about the effective-
ness of economic sanctions in advancing international environmental goals.
168. See Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. § 1, at § 4(1)(A), (B) (1999)
(including, without supporting findings, all environmentally motivated sanctions within defi-
nition of term "unilateral economic sanction" except "in a case in which the United States
imposes the measure pursuant to a multilateral regime and other members of that regime have
agreed to impose substantially equivalent measures"). See also Kittredge Testimony, supra
note 9.
169. PRESIDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL REVIEW, supra note 38, at 1-7 (drawing general
recommendations for limiting "unilateral economic sanctions" with no analysis of environ-
mental trade measures); CATALOG OF NEW SANCTIONS, supra note 4, at 6-7 (including
environmentally motivated sanctions in same category as "national security" sanctions on the
strength of (1) a single statement by former Secretary of State Warren Christopher that hence-
forth "national security" would encompass environmental protection and (2) a one-paragraph
description of a single case in which the United States declined to provide export financing
for hydroelectric turbines offered to China's Three Gorges dam).
170. Chayes and Chayes, for example, infer the general ineffectiveness of treaty-based
economic sanctions based on the experience of five cases: South Africa, Rhodesia, Iraq, Haiti
and Yugoslavia. Three of these are cases in which sanctions were asked to achieve some of
the most difficult objectives conceivable: a fundamental change of government, surrender of
weapons, or (in the case of former-Yugoslavia) acquiescence to the secession of a province,
Bosnia-Herzegovina. What the failure of sanctions to topple or deter hostile governments in
these cases tells us about the utility oftrade leverage in securing compliance with the Mont-
real Protocol is anybody's guess. Yet Chayes and Chayes, far from limiting their conclusions
to the realm from which their supporting data is drawn, go so far as to assert that foreign pol-
icy sanctions are likely to be more effective than environmental ones: "We derive these
lessons [concerning the inefficacy of sanctions] from situations in which the UN Security
Council was called upon to deal with threats to the peace, however broadly defined. But the
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Yet experience and logic both suggest that the claim that environ-
mental sanctions are "like" high foreign policy sanctions is wrong or, at
best, a half-truth. The true part is that all problems in international coop-
eration do share certain structural and thematic similarities which IR
theory explores in depth. For instance, IR theory teaches that interna-
tional cooperation problems implicate a "learning" process whereby
perceptions of national interest may change, either through change of
mind, or through the empowerment of new groups or individuals holding
certain beliefs.'7 ' International cooperative arrangements likewise tend,
in varying degrees, to trigger arguments about the legitimacy and fair-
ness of alternative rules and/or outcomes.' Cooperative problems-
whether they involve nuclear non-proliferation or codfish stocks-may
(or may not) involve well-developed institutions designed to reduce
transactions costs of cooperation and overcome problems of collective
action.'73 The design, legitimacy and functionality of these institutions
will bear heavily on actors' calculation of the costs and benefits of coop-
eration. In most if not all cases considerations of power-the power of
the sender in absolute terms and/or relative to that of targets-will play a
role in determining both whether cooperation occurs and the terms on
which it occurs. 14 In all cases, we might expect that the personal quali-
ties and choices of individual leaders will contribute importantly to final
results."'
All of these factors combine to determine, at any given moment in
time, the political and economic "payoff matrix" (or, in laymen's terms,
the costs and benefits) associated with cooperative, and non-cooperative,
outcomes. At the most basic level, when economic sanctions are used or
threatened, their probability of success from the sender's standpoint will
depend, in all cases, on the same basic calculus: whether the sanctions
threatened or imposed are large enough and likely enough to be imposed
(and, if imposed, to persist) to overcome the target's resistance to coop-
lessons are not confined to such situations. They are inherent characteristics of the interna-
tional system. If anything, they have even greater impact when the high stakes and the
unifying and galvanizing features of a threat to the peace are absent. Coercive sanctions are
more infeasible for everyday treaty enforcement than as a response to crisis. Treaties with
teeth are a will-o'-the-wisp." CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 43, at 67.
171. See INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 123, at 133-210.
172. See LEGITIMACY, supra note 136; THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995).
173. See, generally, ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984) (constructing an institutionalist model
of international cooperation).
174. For an overview of various theories concerning the role of power in international
bargaining, see INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 123, at 83-135.
175. See Young & Osherenko, supra note 125, at 246.
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eration "on the merits." And in all cases, we would expect each of the
categories of factors alluded to above-cognitive, moral, institutional,
material and personal-to play significant roles in determining threat
magnitude, credibility, and target state resistance.
Notwithstanding these formal similarities, however, the two kinds of
sanctions are really quite different in their nature, political dynamic and
mode of operation. This can be seen at the most basic level by simply
reviewing some of the key explanatory variables which HSE analyze in
their study of "high foreign policy" sanctions: (a) companion policies
involving covert, military, or quasi-military action, (b) economic health
and political stability of the target; (c) pre-sanction overall trade linkage
between target and sender; (d) ratio of sender GNP to target GNP; and
(e) the existence of a state of world war-in short a set of variables
aimed at capturing a dynamic of one country fully mobilized in opposi-
tion to another. 7 6 One would hardly expect such a study to yield much
insight into the effectiveness of, say, shrimp import embargoes aimed at
protecting endangered sea turtles.
Here are a few further differences between foreign policy and envi-
ronmental sanctions. First, foreign policy sanctions-whether aimed at
de-stabilizing foreign governments, promoting human rights, weakening
an enemy's military potential, deterring nuclear proliferation or punish-
ing military aggression-typically implicate the fundamental security
interests or the basic power structure of the target state, at least in the
perception of that state. 77 Such cases involve very high perceived politi-
cal costs of compliance by the target state. By contrast, environmental
sanctions seldom implicate core target state interests. 7 1 Indeed, the issue
in ETL episodes is often not a state action at all, but the activity of a
group of private producers. 79 In such cases, the state is not stigmatized
176. See ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (lst ed.), supra note I, at 99-101.
177. HSE, for example, examine economic sanctions having one or more of five main
objectives: (1) destabilizing foreign governments; (2) disrupting military adventures; (3) im-
pairing the military potential of an enemy state; (4) accomplishing some other "major policy
change" (such as ending apartheid in South Africa); or (5) accomplishing a more "modest"
policy change. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.), supra note 1, at 41-48. Even
the so-called "modest" policy changes involve demands that are often highly sensitive in
target states: e.g. protecting human rights, imprisoning or extraditing terrorists, abstaining
from acquiring nuclear weapons, and returning property that has been expropriated for politi-
cal reasons, as in Mexico's nationalization of its oil wells. See id. at 41-42, 150. Any
newspaper reader will appreciate that few if any of these "modest" goals actually appear mod-
est to the target states involved.
178. The one exception may be climate change which, of course, implicates the fossil
fuel energy production and consumption patterns of every state.
179. In the tuna-dolphin case, for example, the issue was the activity of tuna fishermen,
Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage, supra note 40, at 13-18; in the shrimp-turtle case, the
activity of shrimp trawlers, Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 40, at 2.9-2.16.
Winter 2000]
Michigan Journal of International Law
nor is its authority challenged: indeed, the authority of the state is solic-
ited in its capacity as a sovereign regulator of private actors under its
jurisdiction. In political terms, then, the task set to environmental sanc-
tions is typically much easier than the challenge confronting foreign
policy sanctions.
Second, ETL is generally much more narrowly focused than the
sweeping embargoes typically inflicted on foreign policy bugbears. A
ban on imports of purse-seine-caught yellowfin tuna harvested by Mexi-
can vessels in the Eastern Tropical Pacific is simply not the same thing,
in its economic or political impact, as a wholesale ban on commercial
relations with Cuba. Built into the expectations of all actors involved in
the application of ETL are proportionality limits which set strict upper
bounds on the degree of leverage that is likely to be exerted on behalf of
the objective.80 In the high foreign policy realm, those upper limits are
much less strict and clear. While environmental sanctions do impose
economic costs on private actors in foreign lands, they inflict nothing
like the misery associated with comprehensive blockades of Serbia, Iraq,
Haiti, or Cuba.18 ' That powerful argument against foreign policy sanc-
tions does not apply to the much more limited realm of environmental
trade measures.
Third, ETL often (though not always) can be targeted directly at
those causing the environmental harm.'82 The ultimate targets are,
180. Such self-restraint may be variously explained by (1) rules of restraint built into the
world trade law and international law generally; (2) the need to maintain order and friendly
relations; (3) the need to husband the resources of leverage for use in other disputes; (4) the
costliness of sanctions to the sender; (5) threats of retaliation or counter-retaliation (which will
increase as the magnitude of the provocation increases); and (6) the inherent messiness, politi-
cally and conceptually, of linking unlike issues. See Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis
of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 83 GEo. L.J. 2131, 2162-63 (1995).
On international legal constraints on massive retaliation strategies, see for example, Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, opened for
signature Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Doc. MTN/FA (1993), Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, app. 1, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1244
[hereinafter WTO Dispute Understanding] (limiting trade retaliation after successful dispute
settlement and failed efforts to negotiate compliance with panel or Appellate Body decision to
like products as those involved in the dispute (wherever possible) and requiring equivalent
suspension of trade rights in retaliation). In any case, as Chang has observed, grossly dispro-
portionate leverage has not been an issue in the history of environmental sanctions to date,
and there are good, if not conclusive, reasons to expect the pattern of self-restraint to continue.
Chang, supra, at 2162-64.
181. Snake Oil, supra note 6, at C01(" ... economic sanctions can inflict pain on inno-
cent people while at the same time increasing the grip of the leaders we despise. When
sanctions are applied broadside as against Haiti, Cuba, and Iraq the hardest hit are the most
vulnerable: the poor, the very young, the very old and the sick.").
182. For example, sanctions in the tuna-dolphin case were limited to restrictions on im-
ports of purse-seine caught yellowfin tuna harvested in the Eastern Tropical Pacific from
countries whose regulatory programs and/or fleet performance failed to meet U.S. standards.
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moreover, usually economic actors. The result is an economic or at least
quasi-economic calculation that is quite unlike the essentially political
(and often symbolic) calculation involved in the high foreign policy set-
ting.
Fourth, there is a heavy scientific and technical component to envi-
ronmental policy making that is almost entirely lacking in most trade or
foreign policy disputes. This scientific and technical dimension creates a
wide scope for learning which, in turn, may either promote or impede
cooperation, depending on whether the new information supports or un-
dermines the stated goals of sanctions.'83 Either way, the technical and
scientific complexity of the ETL policy realm creates a cognitive dyna-
mism that distinguishes the environmental realm from other areas of
policy. It renders cognitive factors a uniquely important determinant of
ETL necessity and/or effectiveness.
Fifth, most foreign policy and trade policy disputes involve demands
for "don'ts." Don't build atomic weapons, don't invade Kuwait or
Kosovo, don't jail dissidents, don't subsidize, don't restrict imports. Not
doing something places few or no demands on national administrative
capacity, government budgets, or legal structures. By contrast, protecting
intellectual property or the environment requires, in some cases, a very
extensive government apparatus to regulate private-sector harm-causing
activity. Thus, a key factor shaping the effectiveness of ETL is the ca-
pacity of the target state to implement the demands of the sender, and the
degree to which that compliance capacity is enhanced by cooperative
efforts mobilized by the international community. 84 The "capacity fac-
tor," crucial in the environmental realm, is much less significant in areas
where only negative demands are made.
Last but not least, environmental sanctions typically involve import
sanctions, whereas foreign policy sanctions typically involve exports
(and possibly imports as well). 85 The import focus tends to heighten the
The environmental offenders were fishermen and so were the targets of sanctions. See Use
and Abuse of Trade Leverage, supra note 40, at 33-36. Compare this to the comprehensive
ban on all imports, asset freeze, export ban and travel ban which the United States has im-
posed on Cuba since 1962-63. See Case 60-3, U.S. v. Cuba (Castro), in ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.), supra note 49, at 315-23.
183. For an illustration of the double-edged role of learning in regime formation under
trade pressure, see Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage, supra note 40, at 21-29, 37-38, 60-73.
184. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 43, at 197-201 (discussing the importance of ca-
pacity building).
185. Compare GATT Legal Restraints, supra note 3, at 98-106 (reviewing environ-
mental trade sanctions actions, all of which involved import restrictions) with ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (2d ed.), supra note 1, at 59 (noting that when trade weapons are
employed for high foreign policy purposes, "sender countries more frequently use export than
import controls").
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credibility of ETL (thereby promoting its effectiveness) because ETL is
often supported by domestic interests in the sending state, who are
seeking relief from "unfair" competition by foreign competitors that op-
erate without environmental controls. But the same "Baptist-bootlegger"
alliance that helps make environmental leverage more credible may also
tend to make it appear protectionist and illegitimate to target state ob-
servers-thereby heightening the political costs of target-state
acquiescence and tending to diminish the effectiveness of sanctions. 1
6
To say that environmental sanctions operate differently than trade or
foreign policy sanctions in all these ways is not to say that they are nec-
essarily more effective. As has been seen, some of the differences cut in
favor of effectiveness, some cut against. But there is absolutely no basis
in logic to simply assume that all these differences cancel each other out
and may therefore be ignored. However tempting the grand synthesis
may be, however seductive to readers and audiences, it is not valid to
generalize from one broad policy context to another. As Hufbauer ob-
served recently, "environmental sanctions occupy a 'middle space'
between straight commercial disputes ... and foreign policy sanctions.
Accordingly, a different template probably ought to be applied to those
cases. But I haven't given serious thought to what the template should
be." 87 When it comes to specifying variables and interactions of vari-
ables for analysis--explaining and predicting not only whether and
when but how trade leverage works-each realm of sanctions must be
examined on its own terms.
III. TOWARDS AN EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION
FOR SANCTIONS POLICY
In 1993, Elliott (one of the authors of the HSE study) and Uimonen
published a study plugging the relevant values for the Iraq and U.S.
economies into a revised HSE-type model.'88 The goal was to predict the
probability that a country with Iraq's characteristics, insofar as specified
by the model, would capitulate to U.S. sanctions. The results of this
186. See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environ-
mental Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 754-58, 773, 788 (1999) (noting rent-seeking
tendencies of interested groups in environmental regulation generally and disparaging envi-
ronmental trade measures as devices for "rent-seekers to force some inefficient regulatory
regimes on unwilling victims"). For a somewhat more nuanced analysis of both the motives of
sender states and target state responses to environmental trade measures, see Use and Abuse
of Trade Leverage, supra note 40, at 39-42, 73-86.
187. Gary Hufbauer, E-mail to author (Jul. 29, 1999).
188. Kimberly Ann Elliott & Peter P. Uimonen, The Effectiveness of Economic Sanc-
tions with Application to the Case of Iraq, 5 JAPAN & WORLD ECON. 403 (1993).
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analysis were by no means new, having been previously delivered to a
subcommittee of the Joint Economics Committee engaged in delibera-
tions over Iraq sanctions policy in late 1990.89 No expert on Iraq (or
Saddam Hussein) was invited to that hearing. The HSE model, as re-
fined, predicted a 100 percent probability of success.'90
Now, no statistical tool should be faulted for a single predictive fail-
ure. But the case illustrates three important points. First, it reveals the
almost mystical authority bestowed on numbers and purveyors of num-
bers. Second, it reveals some of the most basic flaws of the HSE model:
the disregard of such vital variables as the obstinacy of the target (huge
in Hussein's case) and the international legitimacy of the sanctions
(which rapidly declined, severely eroding international cooperation over
time). Third, it suggests the hazards of cut-and-dried approaches to pre-
dictions of national behavior in individual cases. Scorecards, properly
constructed, may be able to suggest the probability of success if sanc-
tions of a given magnitude are applied to a country that is "like" Iraq in
respect of the variables measured. But one cannot benefit from the law
of averages in trying to predict the outcomes of single cases. The sub-
committee would have been better off consulting an expert on Iraq and
Hussein, than a scorecard on sanctions. '9'
In this article, I have not shown, or attempted to show, that eco-
nomic sanctions are costless, effective, legitimate, or desirable either in
general or in any particular case. Based on the wealth of case studies that
have been done so far, there is, or should be, little dispute that the U.S.
sanctions have often failed to accomplish their goals, and sometimes
have done positive harm.' 92 Nor have I sought to dispute the basic sug-
gestion of USA*Engage that the costs and benefits of sanctions ought to
be more carefully and systematically considered in the future. In fact, I
wholeheartedly support that suggestion.
189. Economic Sanctions Against Iraq: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Educ. and
Health of the Joint Econ. Comm., 101st Cong. 3-29 (1990) (statement of Gary C. Hufbauer,
Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics). HSE also published their optimistic
prediction in the popular press. See Kimberly Elliot et al., The Big Squeeze: Why the Iraq
Sanctions Will Work, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1990, at KI; Gary C. Hufbauer & Kimberly A.
Elliot, Sanctions Will Bite-and Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1991, at A17.
190. See id.
191. A recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) cap-
tured the point nicely: "Crafting targeted sanctions requires detailed intelligence about a
targeted state and its elite's vulnerabilities. At present it is not clear that we have the intelli-
gence support needed for successfully targeting sanctions over a wide set of cases." What
CSIS calls intelligence, I call by the humbler nomenclature of 'data.' See JOSEPH J. COLLINS
& GABRIELLE D. BOWDOIN, BEYOND UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: BETTER ALTER-
NATIVES FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, Executive Summary (1999) available online at
<www.csis.org/pubs/beyondsancsexec.html>.
192. See sources collected supra note 48.
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I have simply shown, first, that widely circulating reports about the
large "costs" of sanctions to the U.S. economy are not supported by the
study they ostensibly rely upon.' 93 Of course, costs to companies should
be weighed in the balance. But there is no economic crisis here. The
policy issue is not whether a given action will maximize Caterpillar's
profits, but whether economic sanctions make good foreign policy, trade
policy or environmental policy sense under the circumstances of each
case.
Second, I have shown that we are not well equipped, at present, to
deal with the effectiveness issue in any systematic and rigorous way.
Anecdotes almost by definition obliterate the key contextual variables
which individually and jointly determine whether sanctions succeed or
fail. Case studies are more nuanced, and HSE have performed a major
service in gathering references to many of these case studies together.9 4
Yet case histories by themselves tend to be complex and unwieldy.
Worse, the case studies done so far are not quality-controlled, do not
follow a consistent format, and do not even look at the same factors.
This greatly impedes efforts to make inter-case comparisons or draw
general conclusions from the experience of history. Existing scorecards
of sanction effectiveness -though widely quoted and highly influential-
are plagued by problems of data, measurement and method which indi-
vidually and collectively undermine their validity. While some of the
conclusions of their authors may make intuitive sense and may well be
true, the scorecards do not prove them.' 95
Third, I have argued that even if the current scorecards of foreign
policy and trade policy sanctions were judged valid within their respec-
tive policy domains, their experience would not carry over to the
international environmental realm. 96 The failure of sanctions to topple
Saddam Hussein or to persuade China to honor human rights tells us
precisely nothing about the ultimate utility of trade leverage in conserv-
ing endangered sea turtles that roam the global commons. Each policy
context needs to be evaluated separately, on its own terms.
Finally, on a different level, I hope I have provided the reader with a
heightened sensitivity to the kinds of things that can go wrong-the
things to watch out for-in quantitative analyses of social policy issues
generally.
193. See supra Part I.
194. See ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st and 2d eds.), supra note 1, passim
(citations appearing at the end of each case study); see also sources collected supra note 48.
195. See supra Part II.B.1-1 1.
196. See supra Part II.B.12.
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What does all this mean for sanctions policy? Policy-makers are al-
ways free to conclude, of course, that the lessons of history about
sanctions are clear and there is little to be gained from further study of it.
"Sanctions don't work," we are constantly told. 97 If things are really that
simple, the answer is to ban them, not study them.
Alternatively, it might be concluded that sanctions sometimes work
and that "common sense" is enough to tell us when sanctions are likely
to work or fail. If so, there is still no need for any new analytical en-
deavor. The problem with this view is that, at present, there does not
seem to be any clear consensus on what that "common sense" is, either
in general or in particular cases.
If, however, it is agreed that we "know" what we think we know
about sanctions only by understanding past experience, and if one ac-
cepts the principal argument of this essay-that our historical analyses
are not as good or reliable as they appear-then it might behoove us to
pay more, and more critical, attention to the source of our "common
sense" beliefs about sanctions.
While my main task in this essay has been to probe the methodo-
logical deficiencies of existing analyses of sanctions, I will close with a
few constructive suggestions on ways that policy-makers might
strengthen sanctions analysis in the future-if, that is, they are truly se-
rious about analyzing the "costs" and "benefits" of sanctions prior to
using or renewing them.
The recommendations that follow may be divided into two broad
categories: (1) broadening and deepening the historical database; and (2)
constructing a more rigorous theoretical framework for analysis. These
recommendations flow directly from the critique set forth in Part II.
Broadening and deepening the historical database. Unearthing the
true role of sanctions will require, at the outset, broadening the focus of
analysis to include "quiet-threat-only" cases, "deterrent" cases, and a set
of "control group" cases in which sanctions were neither threatened nor
applied. Quiet-threat-only cases are relevant because they represent a
significant category of successes that will be lost to diplomacy if all
197. See Kittredge Testimony, supra note 9, at 6 (claiming that "[t]he historical record
on unilateral sanctions is clear: they do not work" while acknowledging that multilateral
measures sometimes work); Pape, supra note 84, at 90. However, unilateral sanctions are
distinguished from multilateral sanctions only by the degree of international cooperation in-
volved. But the latter is itself an endogenous variable that depends on a host of prior factors
such as the international legitimacy of the goal, the degree of third-country interdependence
with the target state, the beliefs of other potential sender states about the likelihood of suc-
cessful sanctions and the strength of the bandwagon effect created by unilateral sanctions that
are then joined by others. So simply saying that sanctions should be "multilateral" begs a
number of important, and prior, questions.
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overt sanctions are abandoned. Also significant are cases where non-
target states are deterred from undesirable activities, without any explicit
threat, because they are unwilling to bear the costs they see inflicted
upon target states who "break the rules." These cases likewise should be
tallied in any cross-cutting analysis of sanctions effectiveness. The
final category of cases that needs to be more carefully considered is the
baseline or "control group" of cases where no credible threat of sanc-
tions has been mobilized, either direct or indirect.' 99 As Baldwin has
repeatedly observed, the value of economic sanctions must be judged by
• • 200
comparing them to their alternatives.
Besides broadening the database to encompass new categories of
cases, scholars and policy-makers should "deepen" the database of his-
tory from which we draw our insights. This involves three related
enterprises: (1) quality-controlling the database; (2) quality-controlling
the analysis; and (3) developing a consistent and rigorous template for
analyzing past and future sanctions impacts. Consider first the quality of
the database. Whose account of the South African sanctions story do we
believe? Whose account of Iraqi or Cuban sanctions do we believe? As
seen, HSE offer no discussion of either the basis for their selection of
case studies, or of their selection of excerpts to quote from each study.2°'
For this I do not fault them: had they tried to do so, their study would
quickly have become prohibitively long. Nonetheless, it is essential to
quality control-for accuracy, reliability and completeness-the case
198. It is not clear how frequent these cases are, or how they might be found. Discover-
ing them would seem to require eavesdropping on the councils of foreign governments. We
do have agencies who make such eavesdropping their mission and it might be possible to task
these agencies with preparing classified intelligence estimates of the impact of economic
sanctions on the decision processes in target and similarly situated non-target states.
199. Of course, the admonition to look at threat cases is subject to caricature. U.S. stat-
utes often authorize sanctions while leaving the executive varying degrees of discretion in
deciding whether to impose sanctions in a particular case. See, e.g., Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 137 1(a)(2) (1985) (mandating a ban on imports of tuna caught
with an "incidental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of United
States standards" but leaving the executive broad discretion in making the threshold determi-
nation of comparability). Defining "threat-only" cases to include every situation in which the
United States speaks on behalf of a goal which it has the authority to support with economic
sanction, would potentially sweep in virtually every U.S. diplomatic exchange! Prudence and
common-sense both suggest a much narrower definition: "threat" cases are those cases in
which the United States executive not only has the authority to issue a sanction but expresses
a clear intention to use that authority in a well-defined manner if certain specified conditions
are not met. These occasions arise much less frequently in diplomatic intercourse and, when
they arise, there is no mistaking them. For an example of the distinction see Use and Abuse of
Trade Leverage, supra note 40, at 20-30.
200. ECONOMIC STATECRAFT, supra note 13, at 123.
201. See supra Part 1I.B.3.
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studies from which we derive the "insights" that actually shape sanctions
policy.
Second, sanctions analysis must be protected to the extent possible
against subjective biases. In particular, only the most Panglossian ob-
server would assume that reliable, unbiased sanctions analysis will
emerge from the current ad hoc system that pays no attention whatever
to the identity and predilections of those preparing the analysis. Rosen-
thal's pioneering work on expectancy effects, discussed earlier in this
essay, should lay this naive assumption to rest.0 2 While prior expecta-
tions cannot be entirely eliminated, it is important to minimize such
effects and correct for biases that may result from them. This entails, at a
minimum, ensuring that sanctions analysis is performed by scholars
having a range of opinions about the utility of sanctions. It means en-
suring that uncertainties and divergences of conclusions are frankly
disclosed in the report of each analysis. And it means separating the
analytical function from operational agencies and from those who have a
203financial stake in the outcome.
Third, sanctions impact analysis-to be reliable-must apply a rig-
orous and consistent analytical framework that reflects the best that
theory and experience teach about the determinants of sanctions effec-
tiveness. As I have shown, a number of vital determinants of the
effectiveness of sanctions have been neither adequately accounted for in
the HSE scorecard nor consistently scrutinized in other case studies: (1)
threat magnitude and credibility; (2) economic impact of actual sanc-
tions on target; (3) political cost of sanctions to target; (4) political cost
to target of complying with sanction-backed demands; and (5) the moral
compliance-pull (legitimacy and fairness) of the sender's objectives in
the perception of both target and other sender states. 24 These variables
must be factored in-along with the variables with HSE do attempt to
capture-in any study that purports to yield policy-relevant conclusions
about sanctions.
Nor is it correct to consider these variables in isolation from each
other. Sanctions of any given size can be expected to have quite different
consequences depending on whether the objectives sought are large or
small, intensely or lightly valued.2 5 Credible sanctions studies must
202. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
204. See supra Part II.B.6.
205. For example, one would expect sanctions of $41 million targeted on India and
linked to agricultural reform, to have a much greater influence than sanctions of $34 million
targeted at Pakistan and aimed at deterring nuclear proliferation (though both are classified as
"modest policy changes."). Compare ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1st ed.), supra
note 49, at 404-08 (Case 65-2) with id. at 636-43 (Case 79-2).
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capture the relationship between factors such as size and credibility of
sanction, on one hand, and political cost of compliance, on the other.
Measuring variables such as legitimacy and political cost of compliance
is obviously a formidable challenge, particularly if some type of quanti-
fication is proposed. If quantification is not attempted, analysts should at
least provide an ordinal sense of the rough proportionality (or lack
thereof) between the size and impact of sanctions as applied and the
magnitude of the objectives sought. The variables and interactions thus
identified should reflect our best knowledge of all the causal pathways
by which sanctions shape behavior, singly and in interaction with other
factors. °0
Beyond specifying the correct variables, analysts must account for
feedback effects between effectiveness and prior beliefs about effective-
ness (endogeneity). 7 Clearly, it is important to distinguish between
sanctions which fail for objective economic or political reasons related
to nature of the objective or target, and sanctions which fail to be im-
posed (or to win the cooperation of other states) simply because of a
generalized pessimism about efficacy of sanctions.0 8 While the endpoint
of these two situations is the same (failure), the policy prescriptions that
flow from them are quite different.
Finally, it is vitally important to be clear about what is meant by
"effectiveness" and to define the basic units of analysis (the "cases") in a
way that is consistent with that definition. As explained earlier,
"effectiveness" cannot be accurately measured by counting the immedi-
ate results of individual face-offs between sender and target states.2°9
Sanctions may fail, for example, to achieve reversal of a politically mo-
tivated expropriation by a target state but nonetheless deter further
expropriations by that state or others. Such sanctions achieve strategic
success notwithstanding tactical failure. Likewise, sanctions may compel
the target state into submission in a single face-off while arousing the re-
doubled opposition of other states and the rest of the world to the sender
state's demands on that issue. Such sanctions should clearly be regarded
as failures. In short, sanctions outcomes therefore should be classified
strategically, with "success" defined in terms of the overall progress of
the international order towards acceptance of the sender's preferences on
the issue at hand, whether it be protection of intellectual property, anti-
206. As I have shown elsewhere, these pathways of influence can be surprisingly subtle
and indirect. See Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage, supra note 40, at 109-10.
207. See discussion supra note 122 and accompanying text.
208. See discussion of endogeneity supra Part II.B.7.
209. See discussion supra Part II.B.5.
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